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THE DEMOCRATIC COMMON LAW 
Matthew Steilen* 
This article explores the democratic features of common-law judicial law-
making. It begins by examining the so-called “classical” account of the 
common law, associated with English jurists Edward Coke and Matthew Hale. 
These jurists describe the common law as a kind of “reasonable custom” that 
emerges out of a public process in which lawyers exchange reasons with the 
court about how to resolve a dispute. The article then turns to modern 
common-law adjudication, and, drawing on the work of Fred Schauer, Edward 
Levi, Martin Golding, and others, shows how public deliberation prominently 
features in the modern adjudicative process as well. The core idea is that 
modern common-law adjudication requires the court to engage the arguments 
of the parties in determining how the law ought to apply to their case. This 
makes the court responsive to the concerns of those it governs. The article then 
draws a comparison between common-law adjudication, so described, and the 
legislative process. To do so, the article summarizes the key ideas behind the 
“deliberative” theory of democracy, which argues that democratic law is 
legitimate because it arises out of a collective process of public deliberation 
over the wisdom of a proposed policy. Legislation under the deliberative theory 
of democracy is similar to common-law adjudication, in that in both cases, 
legitimacy depends on a process of exchanging reasons about the appropriate 
collective course of action. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article is about a leading criticism of the common law. In rough outline, 
the criticism is that the common law is undemocratic because it is judge-made 
law.1 In a democracy, the people or their representatives are responsible for 
making the law; judges are meant to apply it. The common law would seem to 
be an exception. Judges make the common law and apply it, giving them a large 
measure of control over the resolution of common-law disputes. Placing this 
kind of authority in the hands of unelected officers is undemocratic. 
                                                
* J.D. Stanford 2008, Ph.D. Northwestern 2005. Thanks to Vincent Chiao, Josh Cohen, Tom 
Grey, Todd Hedrick, Howard Kaplan, Larry Kramer, Fred Schauer, Norm Spaulding, and 
Markus Wagner for their criticisms and suggestions, which improved this article considerably. 
Conversation with Dick Craswell also helped to develop the ideas here. Finally, thanks to 
audiences at Thomas Jefferson Law School and the University at Buffalo Law School. 
1 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 9 (1997). 
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The argument of this article is that the common law actually shares the 
characteristics that make democratic law legitimate. In defending this position, 
the article sets aside what is arguably the common law’s strongest claim to 
democratic legitimacy: the jury. The focus here is on motion practice and on 
appeals. The reason for this focus is the nature of the criticism sketched above, 
which is centered on the judge, not the jury. The view taken of motion practice 
and appeal is normative and largely conventional. The article does not aim to 
deny what are obvious truths about the common-law judge’s role in these 
practices. It does not deny that the judge alone makes the final determination of 
what the law is and how it applies to the case before her. Nor does the article 
deny that a significant number of common-law judges are unelected, and thus 
not answerable through the vote to the people they govern. (Of course, the 
article does not deny that a significant number of common-law judges are 
elected, either.) Such distinctions between common-law adjudication and the 
legislative process are indeed significant.2 
The idea developed here is that, despite these differences, common-law 
adjudication mimics the deliberative process that gives enacted law its 
legitimacy. As Cass Sunstein has put it, “democracy is no mere statistical 
affair.”3 What gives enacted law its special legitimacy is that it arises from the 
collective decisions of those subject to the law.4 In a heterogeneous society of 
free and equal persons, the collective decision-making process is characterized 
by an exchange of reasons that reasonable people can regard as justifying the 
policy in question.5 This exchange of reasons bears a strong resemblance to the 
exchange of reasons in common-law adjudication. The litigants in a dispute 
offer the court their interpretations of precedent and their views of how it 
ought to apply to their case. They have the opportunity to tell the court why the 
policy of precedent is appropriate or inappropriate, given the facts at hand. The 
court’s opinion responds to the arguments made by the litigants, and it justifies 
the outcome by showing how precedent is best understood to apply. That 
                                                
2 Similarly, the article does not deny, or even address, the fact that a large number of disputes 
fail to even make it before a judge, but are resolved in mediation, arbitration, or other forms of 
dispute resolution.  
3 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 25 (1999). 
4 Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY & DIFFERENCE: 
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95 (Seyla Benhabib, ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
Procedure and Substance]. 
5 See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 137 (1999). This, of 
course, is a normative claim. 
THE JOURNAL JURISPRUDENCE 
(2011) J. JURIS 439 
justification should be one reasonable litigants would regard as compelling, 
even if they happen to disagree with the outcome.6 
In short, if the deliberative process makes enacted law legitimate, then its 
kissing cousin, the common-law process, makes judge-made law legitimate as 
well. But the common law’s claim to what I will call “democratic legitimacy” 
does not end there. In contrast to the legislative process, common-law 
adjudication is highly participatory. Litigants in common-law disputes typically 
appear on their own behalf (with the assistance of counsel), present arguments 
to the court as to how the law should apply to their case, and appeal where they 
disagree with the outcome. These practices help make the court responsive to 
the concerns of those bound by its decisions—the hallmark of democratic 
legitimacy. In a similar fashion, the process of constant revision typical of the 
common law—often maligned by its critics as undemocratic7—ensures that the 
law remains responsive to the circumstances of those it binds. In contrast, 
statutory law is a “dead hand” from the moment of enactment, and continues 
to bind those whose circumstances lie far outside the scope imagined for the 
law by its authors.8 Judge-made law must constantly live up to its own 
purported justification, or risk alteration to fit the circumstances.9 
Together, these observations support what is a new and significant argument 
about the common law.10 Even some of the common law’s staunchest 
                                                
6 See MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 9 (1984) (“Ideally, a judge’s reasons should be 
reasons that the losing litigant will recognize as good reasons; but in any event the judge will 
want his or her reasons to be reasons that independent observers, especially other judges and 
lawyers, will find acceptable.”). Many of the characteristics described in this and the following 
paragraph were the subject of study in Tom Tyler’s book, Why People Obey the Law. Tyler 
showed that procedural justice was a more powerful determinant than outcomes of individuals’ 
judgments that the law was legitimate. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 96, 100 
(1990), and part III(A), infra. 
7 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing Robert Rantoul). 
8 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 127 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (“The one thing that is certain, however, is that the enacting authority can never foresee 
all the questions.”). 
9 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881) (“[T]he process which I have described has 
involved the attempt to follow precedents, as well as to give a good reason for them. When we 
find that in large and important branches of the law the various grounds of policy on which the 
various rules have been justified are later inventions to account for what are in fact survivals 
from more primitive times, we have a right to reconsider the popular reasons, and, taking a 
broader view of the field, to decide anew whether those reasons are satisfactory.”). 
10 For a similar thesis about adjudication as a whole, pointed out to me by Jim Gardner after 
this paper was drafted, see Christopher J. Peters’s excellent article, Adjudication as Representation, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997). Peters argues that, under certain ideal conditions, adjudication 
enables the “representation” of litigants’ interests, and therefore has democratic legitimacy 
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defenders appear to blanch at the practice of judicial law-making. For example, 
in a recent defense of common-law constitutionalism, David Strauss attempts 
to preserve the common law against the criticism that it is undemocratic by 
separating it from judicial review.11 The common law, he says, is not 
intrinsically a judicial method; “[o]ther institutions, besides courts, can use a 
common law approach to making decisions.”12 If a democratic institution like 
the legislature can use a common-law approach, then it follows that the 
common law itself is neither democratic nor undemocratic. Of course, this is an 
unusual view of the common law; it is at odds with classical common law 
theory, which understood the common law as a judicial practice.13 More 
importantly, it is at odds with most contemporary accounts of the common law, 
which define common-law adjudication as a kind of judicial decision-making.14 
In any case, Strauss’s “defense” of the common law has the effect of 
abandoning what is unquestionably the leading forum for its practice—the 
court—which is a Pyrrhic victory by any measure. Even if the common law as 
practiced in the legislative branch is democratic, it evidently lacks this quality as 
practiced by the courts. In contrast, the argument of this article is that the 
common law as practiced by the courts enjoys the same legitimacy as enacted 
law. 
This thesis is important because many of this century’s most significant 
developments in private law occurred in common-law adjudication. Strauss’s 
view leaves these decisions open to the criticism above, which frames them 
largely as judicial usurpation of the legislative power. For example, then-Justice 
Traynor of the California Supreme Court began his concurrence in Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno by announcing, 
I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out 
as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one 
                                                                                                                        
under both “proceduralist” and “functionalist” theories of democracy. See id. at 346-47. The 
present paper aims at a slimmer target. The idea here is that the argumentative process of 
common-law decision-making—not the interest-aggregating or interest-representing features of 
adjudication in general—confers a special kind of political legitimacy on judge-made law. In 
short, it is the legitimacy of the better argument. Whether the adjudicative process can be said 
to represent litigants’ interests is not taken up here. 
11 David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 47 (2010). 
12 Id. 
13 GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 9, 14-17 (1986) 
(contrasting lex scripta and lex non scripta). 
14 See, e.g., BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 146 (4th ed. 2006) (“Common 
law reasoning involves the (1) incremental development of the law, (2) by judges, (3) through 
deciding particular cases, with (4) each decision being shown to be consistent with earlier 
decisions by a higher or co-equal court.”). 
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[i.e., products liability cases]. In my opinion it should now be 
recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an 
article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human 
beings. . . . Even if there is no negligence, . . . public policy demands 
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the 
market.15 
This view proved highly influential and eventually garnered a majority of the 
supreme court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.16 What is noteworthy 
about the Escola concurrence is Justice Traynor’s naked invocation, at the very 
outset of the opinion, of what he “believe[s]” “public policy demands.” As he 
sees it, a rule making manufacturers strictly liable will “most effectively reduce 
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products,” because 
manufacturers can best anticipate hazardous defects, consumers lack the 
resources to pay the costs of injury, and such a rule will discourage the 
manufacture and distribution of defective products.17 The reasoning has the 
look and feel of a policy argument. Notably, that argument has garnered 
significant criticism from professional economists.18 Moreover, Justice 
Traynor’s judgment of where California ought to place the significant social 
cost imposed by defective-product injuries appears, at the outset, to be 
untethered from legal authority. In the eyes of the common law’s critics, the 
Justice is simply “playing king.”19 
                                                
15 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944); see 
also id. at 443-44 (“The manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the 
changing relationship between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product 
has become so complicated as to require one or more intermediaries. Certainly there is greater 
reason to impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a 
product that he is not himself able to test.”). 
16 See 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963) (citing Escola, 150 P.2d at 440). 
17 Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. 
18 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1437, 1478-79 (2010) (criticizing Justice Traynor’s analysis and observing that market 
forces give manufacturers reason to ensure the safety of their products). 
19 SCALIA, supra note 1, at 7. There will be occasion to defend the great Chief Justice Traynor 
below. Initially, one should keep in mind that (1) the opinion is a concurrence, and it is not 
unusual for a concurring judge to announce how he “believe[s]” a case should be resolved, even 
if the law does not presently support such a resolution; and (2) immediately following the policy 
discussion is a legal analysis, including an analysis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, showing 
that, in effect, California already made manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by 
defective products. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. 
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The criticism that the common law is undemocratic is not confined to state 
courts and state law. It plays a pivotal role in theories of judicial decision-
making and in debates about the proper role of federal courts in a democracy. 
Theoretical accounts of judicial decision-making that are “legislative” in tenor 
expand the apparent scope of judicial discretion and thereby strengthen the 
charge that the common law is undemocratic.20 Such accounts have generated 
enough anxiety that leading theories of judicial review are often built around 
concerns of democratic legitimacy.21 The criticism also has direct implications 
for discussions of the proper role of federal courts in our political system. 
Although there has been little federal common law since Erie, significant 
pockets of it remain, and constitutional litigation has a strong common-law feel 
to it.22 Progressives made democracy a central theme of their attacks on the use 
of the common law by federal courts to strike down labor laws in the early 
twentieth century,23 and of their subsequent effort during the New Deal to 
                                                
20 See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 10 (“[James Madison] wrote in an era when the prevailing image 
of the common law was that of a preexisting body of rules, uniform throughout the nation . . . 
that judges merely ‘discovered’ rather than created. It is only in this century, with the rise of 
legal realism, that we came to acknowledge that judges in fact ‘make’ the common law, and that 
each state has its own.”). Whether this was the “prevailing image” of the common law or not, 
Madison was certainly aware of the criticism that judges made, rather than “discovered,” the 
law—Jeremy Bentham, the great critic of the common law, wrote Madison about the very issue. 
See Jeremy Bentham, Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction, in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 459-60 (John Bowring, ed., 1962) (1811) (in a letter written to James 
Madison).  
21 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at xiv, 259-60; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 67-69, 73 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959) (responding to Judge Learned 
Hand). 
22 A significant branch of federal common law that survived Erie is federal maritime law; in 
some circuits, maritime disputes are common. Even areas of law where statutes predominate 
may have a common-law character to them, if those statutes specify only general standards of 
conduct. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 16-17 & n.7 (2009 (contrasting 
sections 16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Regarding the common-law 
character of constitutional law, see STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 33-49; David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 928, 930-32 (1996). 
23 See Tom Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 496, 498-99 (1996) (“Scientific 
legislative reform, guided by experts pursuing shared public values, had to replace analogical 
judicial reasoning from precedents at the center of the legal process. Judicial resistance to 
democratic reforms was retrograde, whether it took the aggressive form of laissez-faire 
constitutionalism or stemmed from Langdellian inattention to legislation and obsessive focus 
on the details of private law doctrine. . . . Courts should defer to legislatures in constitutional 
cases, should ascertain and promote legislative purpose in interpreting statutes, and should draw 
on the policies reflected in statute law to sublegislate the fields left by legislatures to common 
law development.”); Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 19-20 
(1906). 
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establish administrative agencies and insulate them from judicial interference.24 
Justiciability doctrines, which emerged from the latter effort, are usually 
explained as preventing judicial politicking in matters properly reserved for 
“politically accountable branches of government.”25 More generally, it is 
commonplace today to hear that constitutional rulings by federal courts are 
undemocratic, although the political valence of the critics has largely changed. 
In what follows, I will develop the argument, outlined above, that the common 
law is “democratically legitimate.” The article proceeds in five parts. Part II 
examines the criticism that the common law is undemocratic. As I view that 
criticism, it is concerned with the practice of judicial law-making, rather than 
the indeterminacy of legal reasoning, which is a distinct (although related) issue. 
Part III develops a normative account of common-law adjudication. It is 
divided into three sections. Sections one and two examine classical and modern 
theories of the common law, respectively. The key idea that emerges is that 
common-law adjudication involves a public practice of exchanging reasons in 
support of or against the requested relief. Section three of Part III offers a brief 
theoretical treatment of this practice, by focusing on the kinds of reasons 
exchanged in common-law adjudication—i.e., “objective,” or “neutral” reasons. 
This theory provides a framework both for understanding the common law and 
for explaining its similarities to democratic deliberation. Part IV of the paper 
fills in the formal account by examining Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola. 
Contrary to the usual view of Escola, I argue that the concurrence is not entirely 
driven by public policy, but is the product of a careful examination of the 
structure of products liability doctrine in California. In the last part of the 
article, Part V, I draw the comparison between the common law and 
democracy. I begin with an outline of the deliberative theory of democracy, and 
compare this account to the article’s account of the common law. To capture 
the similarity between democracy and the common law, I describe them as two 
forms of “deliberative law-making,” and I argue that the deliberative 
characteristics of common-law adjudication function to legitimate judge-made 
law. 
II.  THE CRITICISM 
The criticism that the common law is undemocratic has a long and rich history. 
I am going to focus on two prominent critics in this line: Justice Scalia and 
Jeremy Bentham. Their criticisms of the common law are different, and it is 
                                                
24 See Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23-25 (1936).  
25 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 35 (5th ed. 2007); accord SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 39. The extent to which administrative agencies are politically accountable is 
debatable. 
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important to understand this difference. Scalia’s concern is indeterminacy, while 
Bentham’s concerns are notice and the public character of law. 
Scalia’s attack on the common law in A Matter of Interpretation is directed at its 
use in resolving questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional law.26 
He begins with the idea that the common law is based on custom.27 As we will 
explore below, the customary character of the common law was a central part 
of the classical common law theory dominant in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.28 In Scalia’s view, however, “from an early time, as early as the Year 
Books, which record English judicial decisions from the end of the thirteenth 
century to the beginning of the sixteenth—any equivalence between custom 
and common law had ceased to exist.”29 But if the common law is not based on 
the custom of the people, then it must be based on judicial decisions—that is, 
on precedent. As Scalia observes of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s The Common Law, 
“[Justice Holmes] talks a little bit about Germanic and early English custom. 
But mostly [he] talks about individual court decisions, and the judges, famous 
and obscure, who wrote them.”30 
The problem with a system of law based on court decisions is that decisions do 
not constrain later judges. The task of applying and distinguishing precedent is, 
Scalia says, “an art or a game, rather than a science, because what constitutes 
the holding of an earlier case is not well defined and can be adjusted to suit the 
occasion.”31 By “squinting narrowly,” and incorporating the facts of a prior 
decision into the holding, a court can give narrow scope to the precedent. 
Conversely, when a court wants precedent to apply, it can broadly characterize 
the holding by deemphasizing or overlooking factual differences between the 
prior case and the instant one. In short, the system of judicial precedent on 
which modern common-law adjudication is based leaves the court free to take 
                                                
26 SCALIA, supra note 1, at 12-13. Although Scalia distinguishes constitutional common law from 
the private common law of tort, contract, and property, it is not because he believes there are 
no democratic concerns about the application of common law methods to private law. Rather, 
Scalia concedes that private common law is undemocratic, but suggests that this may be a good 
thing. Id. at 12. Since I am concerned to defend the democratic credentials of private law, I will 
set aside Scalia’s distinction, and focus on how his criticisms reflect on the common law 
generally. 
27 Id. at 3-4. 
28 See infra section III.A.1. 
29 SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3. This puts Scalia at odds with the leading proponents of the classical 
common law theory, notably Edward Coke, Matthew Hale, and William Blackstone, all of 
whom took the position that the common law was customary in some sense. See POSTEMA, 
supra note 13, at 4-7. 
30 SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3. 
31 Id. at 8. 
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any action it thinks best. As Scalia memorably puts it, “playing common-law 
judge . . . consists of playing king—devising, out of the brilliance of one’s own 
mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind. How exciting!”32 Permitting 
judges to do this, he says, is inconsistent with democracy and with the principle 
of separation of powers.33 Our constitutional system preserves liberty by 
separating the power of the legislator and the power of the judge.34 
In contrast to Scalia, Jeremy Bentham’s attack was not rooted in apparent 
defects with the system of precedent—in fact, stare decisis was just emerging at 
the time. Bentham’s criticisms of the common law are especially voluminous, 
but he was centrally concerned with “legal fictions,” which were constructs 
used by lawyers and judges to fit claims for relief into the “writs” recognized by 
English common law at the time.35 The concept of “legal fictions” is of course 
one with which modern lawyers are also familiar, but in Bentham’s day fictions 
had real teeth. The system of writs and legal fictions was so complex, argued 
Bentham, the actual content of the law was accessible only to lawyers and 
judges. Others were unaware of their rights and therefore could not seek to 
protect them, which largely frustrated the purpose of the law. In Bentham’s 
memorable formulation, 
[W]e are told that we have rights given to us, and we are bid to be 
grateful for those rights: we are told that we have duties prescribed to us, 
and we are bid to the punctual in the fulfillment of all those duties . . . . 
Hearing this, we would really be grateful for these same rights, if we 
knew what they were, and were able to avail ourselves of them: but, to 
avail ourselves or rights, of which we have no knowledge, being in the 
                                                
32 Id. at 7. 
33 Scalia is not entirely clear as to whether he regards these as two separate defects, or one. See 
id. at 10. 
34 Id. Notably, Scalia is content to let the common-law judge continue making private law—a 
practice he thought might be a beneficial limit on popular democracy—but is not content to 
apply common-law methods where statutory law now governs. Id. at 12-13. 
35 See POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 271-75; Jeremy Bentham, supra note 20, at 498. A “writ” is an 
order obtained in the Court of Chancery compelling the defendant to appear before a common-
law court to defend the charge against him. The jurisdiction of the various common-law courts 
in England (the Court of Common Pleas, the King’s Bench, and the Court of Exchequer) was 
limited to certain writs. Each court struggled to increase its jurisdiction at the expense of the 
others, and began to recognize claims for relief previously confined to the other courts. The 
primary means of doing so were fictions, by which the court enabled a party to bring a claim 
for relief nominally presented in a form over which the court had jurisdiction. 
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nature of things impossible, we are utterly unable to learn—for what, as 
well as to whom, to pay the so-called-for tribute of our gratitude.36  
In short, the undue complexity of the common law prevented the public from 
having notice of its content. The lack of notice in turn had a further consequence 
that concerned Bentham. Because the common law was highly complex and its 
content largely unknown to the public, the application of the law was essentially 
unpredictable. Individuals were unable to predict how the common law might 
apply to their own situation. Moreover, judges could use this uncertainty to 
abuse those whose conduct was in question before the court. Because only 
lawyers understood what the law was, and no one was able to challenge that 
understanding, judges could make their decisions on private grounds, and 
conceal these grounds by dressing them in complex legal reasoning.37 This freed 
judges to make law, usurping the proper authority of the legislature.38 It also 
made the public totally dependent on the expertise of lawyers, who, Bentham 
argued, used their advantage to extract rent from their own clients. 
Jeremy Bentham was something of an intellectual star in his time and his 
criticisms of the common law were known to Americans.39 Indeed, the 
American codifiers of the nineteenth century picked up on Bentham’s themes 
of complexity, access, the public character of the law, and judicial usurpation, 
appropriating the arguments for their own efforts to reform the legal system.40 
American codifiers believed that the complexity of the law placed barriers 
between individuals and legal relief to which they might otherwise be entitled.41 
Some argued that appropriate reforms would do away with the bar entirely, by 
making the services of a lawyer unnecessary.42 (Bentham shied away from so 
stark a conclusion.43) Short of this utopian goal, codifiers also argued that 
                                                
36 Jeremy Bentham, Petition for Codification, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 546 (John 
Bowring, ed. 1962) (1829). 
37 POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 272-73; see Bentham, supra note 20, at 488. 
38 POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 273; id. at 274 (“If we wash the history of Common Law with the 
acid of reality we will see that it could not exist except for the constant creative, though 
absolutely unauthorized, actions of the judiciary. Quite literally, Common Law is nothing if it is 
not Judge-made.”). The other criticism of the common law with which Bentham is closely 
associated is that it retroactive law. See Bentham, supra note 36, at 546. This is an important 
criticism, but it is tangential to my focus here. 
39 See supra note 20. 
40 Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 990 (2004) 
(reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004)). 
41 See Spaulding, supra note 40, at 985. 
42 Id. 
43 See Bentham, supra note 20, at 490 (“Every man his own lawyer! — Behold in this the point to 
aim at.”). Bentham goes on to support this idea in principle, but to argue that it was impossible 
to do away with the lawyer and the judge entirely. See id. Nevertheless, it seems likely that 
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reform was necessary to give the law democratic legitimacy.44 “Simplicity and 
accessibility” were essential to maintaining the public’s confidence in the law, 
because they enabled the public to understand the basis on which relief was 
provided or denied.45 Replacing the arcane common-law jurisprudence with 
clear codes would also ensure that the legislature, not the judiciary, exercised 
the legislative power, in keeping with the constitutional system.46 The latter 
point became a recurrent theme of American legal reformers. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Progressives emphasized the democratic authority of 
the legislature to implement popular social changes,47 and this remains an 
important criticism today.48 
As should now be apparent, the criticism that the common law is undemocratic 
is broadly related to a number of traditional complaints against the common 
law. Some of these complaints are more specifically directed at political values 
associated with democracy, such as the separation of powers or the rule of law, 
while others are directed at issues of jurisprudence and judicial decision-making. 
While the complaints are conceptually distinct, they are interrelated; thus, it is 
natural to think of them as a kind of “cluster,” with democracy being the 
overarching theme. Drawing on the discussion above, we can identify the 
following five criticisms:  
1. The common law is determined entirely by the will of the judge, 
who is not constrained by precedent.49 
2. The common law violates the separation of powers, since it 
combines the legislative and judicial powers of government.50 
3. The common law is so complex and unpredictable, judges can 
use it to conceal the real basis of their decisions.51  
                                                                                                                        
Bentham’s inflammatory attacks on lawyers and judges as a kind of rent-seeking, corrupt cabal 
influenced the “utopian” reformers in the United States. See POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 273-74. 
44 Spaulding, supra note 40, at 986. 
45 See id.; cf. POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 272-73 (“[Judicial] [m]endacity is objectionable precisely 
because it takes the process of judicial decision-making entirely out of the public arena.”). 
46 See Spaulding, supra note 40, at 987. 
47 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 406 (1908) 
(“Formerly it was argued that common law was superior to legislation because it was customary 
and rested upon the consent of the governed. Today we recognize that the so-called custom is a 
custom of judicial decision, not a custom of popular action. We recognize that legislation is the 
more truly democratic form of law-making.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
48 See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703-06 
(1974). 
49 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 7-9. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 10. 
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4. The common law is unconnected to popular sentiment or the 
will of the people.52 
5. The common law is form of elitism or aristocracy.53 
The idea that connects these criticisms to each other and to democracy is 
political legitimacy. Democratic law enjoys a special legitimacy. It legitimately 
binds our conduct, and when we violate democratic law, state action 
undertaken to enforce the law against us is also legitimate. We will explore why 
this is so in greater depth below, but the basic idea is that democratic law is 
legitimate because we decided on the law, and we can hardly complain about 
being bound by law we decided on.54 If this is the idea behind democratic 
legitimacy, then it is relatively easy to see how the various complaints identified 
above concern democracy, in a broad sense. Each of the criticisms touches on 
the idea that in common-law adjudication, it is the judge who decides on the 
content of the law, not the people bound by that law. While we cannot complain 
about being bound by our law, we can certainly complain about being bound by 
judge-made law. For this reason, judge-made law lacks the special legitimacy 
that distinguishes democratic law. 
This concern is present, to some extent, in all adjudication, but it is heightened 
in common-law adjudication. Whatever constraints are imposed by the 
language of a statute, those constraints are missing in the “unwritten” common 
law, whose doctrines are entirely judge-made on a case-by-case basis. At the 
same time, this concern is conceptually distinct from the argument that legal 
reasoning is indeterminate, which we saw above expressed by Justice Scalia. In 
other words, the criticism that the common law is undemocratic does not 
simply reduce to the criticism that legal reasoning is indeterminate, giving the 
common-law judge a large measure of discretion in resolving a case. Even if 
legal reasoning were fully determinate, we might object to judges extending the 
law by applying it to a fundamentally new situation. In any case, I will not 
address the larger issue of indeterminacy here, which obviously merits its own 
consideration. Rather, my focus will be on the idea that judge-made law is ipso 
facto politically illegitimate, because in a democracy judges are not supposed to 
make the law. My response to this argument will be that judge-made law is just 
as legitimate as enacted law—that is, as law enacted by representatives 
                                                                                                                        
51 See Bentham, supra note 20, at 488. 
52 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 22, at 928, 930; Pound, supra note 23, at 19 (arguing that the 
common law had been on “the national and popular side,” but now was “against the people”); 
Pound, supra note 47, at 406 (similar). 
53 See, e.g., POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 273-74 (discussing Bentham). 
54 See Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 95; see infra section IV.A. 
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according to a majority decision rule—because the norms of common-law 
adjudication mimic the norms of democratic deliberation, and democratic 
deliberation is what gives enacted law its legitimacy. In short, the central idea is 
that deliberation legitimates. 
III. A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF COMMON-LAW ADJUDICATION 
A.  Class i cal  Common Law Theory 
Classical common law theory is built around two related ideas.55 The first idea is 
custom. The common law is customary law. Its doctrines express, or are based 
on, “immemorial” customs, handed down by tradition, and applied by 
common-law judges to resolve the disputes before them.56 Some jurists 
maintained that common-law rules could be traced, unchanged, to “ancient” 
times, where they originated in the practices and “usage of the people.”57 The 
majority of jurists acknowledged that the rules of the common law evolved 
over time to meet the demands of changing circumstances.58 Despite such 
changes, they argued, the long-standing recognition and application of 
common-law rules was a source of their validity, both in the sense of their 
“wisdom” and their political legitimacy.59 The idea of political legitimacy here is 
                                                
55 “Classical common law theory” is the account of the common law developed by English 
jurists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 3 n.1. The 
classical theory remains influential in contemporary discussions of the common law. See, e.g., 
STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 40-42 (discussing Edmund Burke). What follows draws largely on the 
work of Gerald Postema, whose scholarship in this area is invaluable. See, e.g., id. (especially 
chapters 1 and 2); Gerald Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD. U. 
COMMW. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter CCJ II]; Gerald Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence 
(Part I), 2 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 155 (2002) [hereinafter CCJ I]; see also A.W.B. Simpson, The 
Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND SERIES 77-80, 
91-99 (A.W.B. Simpson, ed., 1973). 
56 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND IN FOUR 
BOOKS 15 (1893 ed.) (1753) (“That ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which 
is called the common law, however compounded or from whatever fountains derived, had 
subsisted immemorially in this kingdom . . . .”). 
57 CCJ I, supra note 55, at 168-76 (Coke was the best known proponent of the view that one 
could trace common-law rules to Saxon or Roman times). This was likely a minority view, and 
is, in any case, an implausible account of the contemporary common law. Id.; see Simpson, supra 
note 55, at 93-94. 
58 CCJ I, supra note 55, at 173-74 (Hale’s favorite image to describe this process was the 
Argonaut’s ship, which maintained its identity through the successive replacement of each of its 
parts). 
59 See POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 5 (in contrast, Postema uses ‘validity’ to refer only to political 
legitimacy); BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 67 (“[T[he authority of these maxims rests entirely 
upon general reception and usage . . . .”); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW OF ENGLAND: DIVIDED INTO TWELVE CHAPTERS WRITTEN BY A LEARNED HAND 24 
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somewhat complex. According to the argument, customary law is legitimate 
because it rests on norms already in effect in the community.60 This applies even to 
law that has evolved, since what counts as the “reasonable” resolution of an 
unforeseen dispute (and thus a reasonable extension of the law) is informed by 
community customs.61 In short, customary law is law the community can 
recognize as its own, because it expresses or reasonably extends the community’s 
own norms.62 This explains why, in the view of classical common law theory, 
the judge did not make common law rules, but only used his training to identify 
and articulate them—much like a kind of expert witness.63 
The second key idea in classical common law theory is reason. In the classical 
view, common-law rules are reasonable rules.64 Thus, the customs expressed in 
the common law were “never merely predictable patterns of behavior in a 
community, but [were] always seen as ‘reasonable usage’.”65 This reasonableness 
was a result of a public practice of examining customary law to determine 
whether it adequately addressed the issue at hand.66 Formally, lawyers reasoned 
in a familiar analogical way: they “argu[ed] a similibus ad similia, from one case to 
the next on the basis of perceived likenesses and differences.”67 By drawing 
such comparisons, lawyers and jurists were lead to evaluate customary practices 
in light of changed circumstances. It was in this regard that they drew on what 
                                                                                                                        
(1713 ed.) (“I therefore stile those Parts of the Law, Leges non Scriptae, because their 
Authoritative and Original Institutions are not set down in Writing . . . but they are grown into 
Use, and have acquired their binding Power and the Force of Laws by a long and immemorial 
Usage, and by the Strength of Custom and Reception in this Kingdom.”). 
60 See POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 16 (“[J]udicial decisions . . . are not exercises of power but 
merely reports of discoveries of an already existing prescriptive order.”). 
61 CCJ I, supra note 55, at 175 (“[F]ollowing the rules and practices shapes the dispositions, 
beliefs, and expectations of the people. Thus, what they take to be reasonable and practicable 
solutions to the problems of social interaction depends on a certain sense of continuity with the 
past . . . [and] what [is] regarded by participants as [a] reasonable projection[] from the 
arrangements and practices of the past to present conditions and problems.”).  
62 Blackstone notably contrasted the common law in this respect with legislative enactment, 
which was the imposition of a rule onto the community by an outside power. See POSTEMA, 
supra note 13, at 16. 
63 See id. at 9. 
64 See Simpson, supra note 55, at 79 (“In the common law system no very clear distinction exists 
between saying that a particular solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and saying 
that it is the rational, or fair, or just solution.”). 
65 CCJ I, supra note 55, at 167 (quoting Thomas Hedley, Speech in Parliament on Royal Impositions, in 
PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, 1610, at 175 (E.R. Foster, ed., 1966)) (emphasis added); see also 
HALE, supra note 59, at 26 (“The Common Law does determine what of those Customs are 
good and reasonable, and what are unreasonable and void.”) 
66 CCJ I, supra note 55, at 167; see also POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 7-8; CCJ II, supra note 55, at 
10; Simpson, supra note 55, at 98. 
67 CCJ II, supra note 55, at 5; POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 11. 
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Coke famously called “artificial reason.”68 Artificial reason contrasted with 
“natural reason”—a faculty possessed by each individual at birth—and was 
acquired by the long study of human affairs and the legal resolution of disputes, 
as crystallized in the rules of the common law. The content of this reason 
developed from public deliberation over how a dispute ought to be resolved. 
As Postema has described this idea, “the artificial reason of the common law 
was thought of as essentially discursive, that is, as a matter of deliberative 
reasoning and argument in interlocutory, indeed forensic, context.”69 This 
“forensic context” was the courtroom, and the exercise of artificial reason 
occurred solely within its walls. “[N]o individual alone, outside a court of 
justice, could ever discover the right reason of a rule of common law.”70 
The public character of common-law reason is perhaps unfamiliar, but it is an 
essential aspect of the classical theory. Proponents of the classical theory were 
largely “skeptics” about natural reason.71 Under pressure from a variety of 
directions, they conceded that the individual capacity of natural reason was 
often indeterminate when applied to concrete practical disputes. Its exercise 
produced no determinate solutions—or worse, was used to cover up what was 
simply the preference of the decision-maker.72 The response of common law 
jurists was to argue that the artificial reason of the common law was a social 
capacity, not an individual one.73 It was exercised in the course of public 
deliberation between litigants and the judge. Public deliberation bridles the 
individual exercise of reason, because it forces a deliberant to openly respond to 
the concerns and interests of his opponents, who naturally take a view different 
than his own.74 This deliberative setting thus makes artificial reason a form of 
common, or shared, reasoning. As Postema has summarized the view: 
The use and acceptance of the law rested on a shared sense of its 
reasonableness and historical appropriateness. It was thought 
insufficient that each member of the law community believes the rules 
reasonable, or wise; they acted from the conviction that this sense was 
shared, a sensus communis. This learned capacity for reflective judgment . . 
                                                
68 CCJ II, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting Edward Coke, Prohibitions del Roy, in THE REPORTS OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE, IN THIRTEEN PARTS 63, 65 (1793)). 
69 Id. at 7 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
70 Id. (citing Edward Coke, First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 97b (1979 ed.) 
(1628)). 
71 POSTEMA, supra note 13, at 60-63. 
72 See id. at 269. 
73 CCJ II, supra note 55, at 8-9. 
74 Id. at 8 (“Artificial reason disciplined individual reason, secondly, by subjecting every 
judgment and argument to cross-examination in a public forum according to public standards 
of success and failure.”). 
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. is a social capacity: the ability to reason from a body of shared 
experiences with normative significance to solutions for new practical 
problems. It is to judge what one has good reason to believe others in the 
community would regard as reasonable and fitting.75  
It is apparent, then, that for the classical jurists, custom and reason were 
interrelated ideas: custom affected the content of “artificial reason,” which was, 
in turn, used to evaluate custom. 
In this way, reason and custom formed the basis of the classical theory of the 
common law. To be sure, some parts of the classical theory no longer remain 
intact, and the contemporary common law has grown to include practices 
unknown to the classical jurists. Contemporary commentators concede, as they 
surely must, that today’s common law does not rest on the common customs of 
the people.76 The assertion that judges merely recognize or discover the law—as 
“experts” of our common custom—is also typically discarded, although there 
may be less reason for this.77 I take it that both concessions can be captured by 
referring to common law as “judge-made law,” and I follow that use here. 
Relatedly, the doctrine of stare decisis developed only in the nineteenth century.78 
While before this time, common-law judges consulted prior decisions as 
evidence of the law, those decisions did not of themselves have a binding 
effect, and their persuasive value was largely determined by the persuasiveness 
                                                
75 Id. at 9 (second emphasis added). 
76 E.g., STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 37 (“Legal systems are now too complex and esoteric to be 
regarded as society-wide customs.”). It is not clear to me that the complexity of today’s common 
law is responsible for its disconnect with custom. The common law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was highly complex and esoteric—indeed, this was a complaint of its 
critics—and much of the complexity of today’s “legal systems” is a feature of statutory and 
administrative law. 
77 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1, at 10. There may be less reason to discard this assertion, 
depending on what we think it means. If it means that controlling precedent can be mistaken, in 
the sense of erroneously stating the law, then it still may be true that judges “discover” the law. 
We probably want to say that even controlling precedents can frame, or state, the law 
incorrectly. 
78 SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 42 n.9 (“[T]he constraints of stare decisis did not become 
accepted until the nineteenth century.” (citations omitted)); see CCJ II, supra note 55, at 12 (stare 
decisis was not a doctrine of the common law before the eighteenth century). This thesis 
should be distinguished from the thesis that common-law judges did not have to, and did not 
tend to, offer reasons for their decisions prior to the 19th or 20th centuries. See David 
Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in COMMON LAW THEORY 
137-46 (2007). The Year Books would seem to pose a problem for this thesis. Although aware 
of this source, Dyzenhaus and Taggart do not discuss the practice of reasoning evidenced by 
the Year Books. Id. at 133-39. 
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of their reasoning.79 Today, precedent is a central part of the common law, and 
the nature of precedential constraint is an important question in common-law 
scholarship.80 
However, this cluster of ideas—judge-made law and binding precedent—did 
little to change reason’s role in common-law adjudication, which has remained 
largely the same. Reasoning by analogy or by example continues to play a large 
role in the modern common law.81 More importantly, as I will now argue, 
identifying and applying precedent continues to require litigants and the court 
to engage in a process of public reasoning very similar to that described by 
classical common law theory. Whether the rule announced in a precedent 
should govern a new factual situation depends on assessing the similarities and 
differences between the two cases, and whether the reasons given in support of 
the prior holding apply with equal force to the present case.82 This assessment 
is carried out in a public setting in which the reasons offered should be 
common—i.e., reasons that the judge and the litigants reasonably believe will be 
persuasive to others. 
B.  Modern Common-law Adjudicat ion  
Modern accounts of common-law adjudication begin from the premise that the 
application of judicial precedent to a case must be justified in a certain way.83 
                                                
79 CCJ II, supra note 55, at 12. The idea that the judge merely recognized, not made, law is 
connected to the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis; if a judge only recognizes the law, then 
his decision is evidence of that law, and does not itself constitute it. For an interesting 
suggestion about why a doctrine of precedent developed, see Simpson, supra note 55, at 98-99. 
In Simpson’s view, the explanation lies in the breakdown of social cohesion precipitated by 
institutional developments in the nineteenth century. 
80 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Precedent, in LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL REASONING (2000); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Stephen Perry, Judicial Obligation, 
Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 221-23 (1987) (developing weak 
and strong Burkean models of precedential constraint). 
81 See, e.g., Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1-2 (1949). 
82 I am not equating the doctrine of precedent with argument by analogy. As evidenced by the 
fact that the latter predated the former by many centuries, the two are distinct. Nevertheless, 
whatever one’s “theory” of precedent, it seems apparent that the identity and authority of 
precedent in any particular case will depend, in some sense, on a measure of the similarities 
between the instant case and previous cases. See, e.g., id. 
83 See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 926-27 (1996) (“[T]he analogical arguments that are this 
Article’s subject are justificatory arguments, and the context of justification also significantly shapes 
their structure.”); Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, in LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL 
REASONING 218 (2000) (describing, as a starting point, a rough account of precedential 
constraint on which “The present court looks at the facts and the results of various precedent 
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This is a fundamental idea about adjudication, and it applies even in cases 
where there is no written opinion or stated justification for a decision. For 
example, although a trial judge ruling on a motion from the bench may not give 
a reason for her order,84 it should be possible to justify that order.85 Moreover, 
the process by which a judicial decision is reached involves procedures and 
norms that require parties and the court to actually engage in legal argument.86 
These procedures are familiar. Substantive motions are typically accompanied 
by briefing in which the parties challenge each other’s positions. The court 
typically examines counsel regarding the basis for a request. When the court 
does this, it will challenge the litigants’ reasoning and may “try out” its own 
view to solicit responses. In at least some cases, the court will set out a 
justification for its decision in a written memorandum or opinion. Although 
this does not always occur, it is likely to occur when an issue is complex and the 
court anticipates an appeal. Litigants disappointed with a decision may move 
the court to “reconsider,” or, if judgment is final, take an appeal or seek 
collateral review where such relief is available. Each of these procedures gives 
rise to legal argument and functions to ensure that the trial court’s decision is 
appropriately justified. 
The idea of justification inherent in adjudication excludes strategic and merely 
rational conduct like bargaining. Thus, a ruling will not be preserved on appeal 
simply because it advances interests important to the court, to a powerful 
litigant, or to a particular interest group. Even rationally optimal decisions that 
advance the interests of both litigants or disadvantage neither are not, by that 
fact alone, “good” decisions in the relevant sense. Of course, a common-law 
                                                                                                                        
cases and then asks which of the cases is most ‘like’—analogous to—the case at hand. The 
court ‘grasps’ the proper analogy—‘This case is more like case x than case y’—and then tries to 
draft a norm that would cover and ‘justify’ the past and present outcomes.”); Perry, supra note 
80, at 236 (“The pervasiveness of this tendency on the party of common law judges to appeal 
both explicitly and implicitly to justifying principles is significant, because it demonstrates that 
propositions of the common law do not possess ‘the relative independence . . . from . . . their 
justifying reasons’ which Raz says is typical of rules . . . . [I]t is a direct appeal to the principles 
underlying those propositions which ultimately seems to lie at the foundations of common law 
reasoning. ”). 
84 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 637 (1995) [hereinafter Giving 
Reasons] (citing these examples, and others, where “legal decisionmakers facing specific 
controversies simply announce results without giving reasons to support them”). 
85 See HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 143 (explaining that ‘reasoned elaboration’ means, in part, 
that the judge “is obliged to relate his decision in some reasoned fashion to the . . . statute out 
of which the question arises”). 
86 See LEVI, supra note 81, at 5 (“The forum protects the parties and the community by making 
sure that the competing analogies are before the court. The rule which will be created arises out 
of a process in which if different things are to be treated as similar, at least the differences have 
been urged.”). 
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court may undertake to justify its decision by appealing to considerations of 
instrumental rationality, especially when deciding to overrule a precedent.87 But 
it must justify its decision nonetheless.88 The court is not merely a market, and 
neither the litigants nor the judge treat it as such.89 
A second fundamental idea is that the legal justifications offered in adjudication 
have a specific audience or “target.” As Martin Golding observed: 
A justification is offered in order to justify to someone the decision or 
conclusion; a justification is directed to an audience. Perhaps the first 
person to whom the justification is directed is the losing litigant; and to 
this may be added all other people whose interests might be adversely 
affected by the result.90 
Golding’s description captures one direction of what is, in effect, a kind of 
dialogue. In the context of common-law adjudication, a court typically does not 
act sua sponte, but in response to the parties’ requests for relief.91 As a result, the 
court’s justification for its decision is often largely responsive to the litigants’ 
own arguments in support of and against the requested relief, and should aim 
                                                
87 A court order may be justified by the parties’ interests in other, more common situations as 
well. Scheduling orders and issues relating to docket management are good examples. The 
federal discovery rules refer expressly to the parties’ convenience. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(2)(C)(i) (requiring the limitation of discovery when it “can be obtained from some other 
source that is more convenient”); id. 26(d)(2) (permitting the court to issue discovery 
sequencing orders “for the parties’ and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice”). 
88 Cf. GOLDING, supra note 6, at 8 (“Reasoned decisions, therefore, can be viewed as attempts at 
rational persuasion; and by means of such decisions, losing parties may be brought to accept the 
result as a legitimate exercise of authority. If this acceptance is achieved, the cause of social 
peace is also promoted.”). Even in cases where a court appeals to considerations of efficiency 
to justify its decision, it will likely consider moral principles or principles of justice as well. 
89 See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) 
(distinguishing contractual order from adjudication on the basis that the latter “confers on the 
affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and 
reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor”). The common recognition that judges have 
preferences or predilections does not defeat this point. The parties appeal to those preferences 
by making certain arguments, a process which, on its face, is very different from bargaining 
with the court.  
90 GOLDING, supra note 6, at 8; accord Dyzenhaus & Taggart, supra note 78, at 148 (“The 
statement of factual findings and reasons reassures the litigants that the case has been 
thoroughly considered by the judge and satisfies the basic human demand of those affected by 
judicial action to be told why. In this way the losing litigant may be able to accept the 
decision.”). 
91 Indeed, it is significant that the most prominent examples of sua sponte decisions in the federal 
system are those relating to subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is not an 
issue of whether relief can be granted under the law—i.e., the court’s “remedial powers.” See 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89-98 (1998). 
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to “squarely meet the proofs and reasoned arguments addressed to [the court] 
by the parties.”92 Furthermore, although the parties address their arguments to 
the court, the justificatory target of their arguments is broader than the judge. If 
a litigant’s arguments are well conceived, they will be those the judge can 
comfortably adopt when setting out reasons for deciding the motion in that 
litigant’s favor. In other words, the litigant’s arguments will be aimed at his 
opponent, and others who may be affected by the court’s ruling, just as Goldberg 
says of the court.93 
The nature of the audience at whom these justifications are directed has an 
important consequence. Both the litigants and the court argue to an adverse 
audience: in the case of each litigant, to the opposing litigant; and in the case of 
the court, to the losing litigant and others similarly affected by the ruling. In 
most cases, this adverse audience will take a contradictory view of whether the 
requested relief should be granted under the law. This is almost always true of 
opposing or losing litigants.94 If we expand audience membership beyond the 
litigants to include all those affected by the court’s ruling, there will be a variety 
of beliefs about the content of the law in question, and about whether it 
provides for the relief requested. A justification for ruling that the law supports, 
or does not support, granting relief must be acceptable to this heterogeneous 
group. 
The diversity of this audience constrains the reasons to which a litigant or judge 
can advert in justifying a decision. As Golding describes it, 
[T]he judges’ reasons will have an objective status in a significant degree. 
Ideally, a judge’s reasons should be reasons that the losing litigant will 
recognize as good reasons; but in any event the judge will want his or 
                                                
92 George C. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 1330 (1969). 
93 This suggests—and I think rightly so—that we should be seriously concerned when a court 
purports to justify its decision on the basis of considerations not introduced and examined by 
the litigants. Among other things, these justifications are deprived of the examination 
institutionalized by the adversarial method. See Fuller, supra note 86, at 388 (discussing this 
question and concluding that it is generally preferable for the court to rest its decision “wholly 
on the proofs and argument actually presented to [it] by the parties.”) 
94 There are situations in which one party does not oppose the relief requested by the other 
party. This may occur for a number of reasons, including strategic assessments about the effect 
an opposition will have of the parties’ other requests, as well as the likelihood an opposition will 
succeed. I will not consider those situations here. 
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her reasons to be reasons that independent observers, especially other 
judges and lawyers, will find acceptable.95 
Because the litigants and the court must direct their justifications toward parties 
who take a different view of the law, the reasons they offer in support of a 
decision must appeal to those with different views. Reasons that successfully 
appeal to all members of this diverse audience will be, as we often say, “broad,” 
or “objective,” or “neutral.” This, of course, is a simple point; but it is not a 
facile one. I will have more to say about “breadth” in section III.C, below. For 
now, the key point is that this breadth, or objectivity, or neutrality is a result of the 
norms governing the adjudicatory process, which require a court to justify its decisions, 
and which institutionalize and encourage an exchange of reasoned arguments 
directed at those with contradictory views of how the law applies to the case at 
hand.96 In light of these norms, a court that wishes to preserve its rulings in a 
                                                
95 GOLDING, supra note 6, at 9; cf. Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
455, 468 (1989) (reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 
(1988) (“As Eisenberg notes, judges are constantly interacting with lawyers on both sides of a 
case, and their opinions are incessantly evaluated by lawyers, by other judges, in treatises, and 
on the pages of law reviews.” (internal citations omitted)). 
96 The term ‘neutral’ evokes Herbert Wechsler’s approach to constitutional jurisprudence, and 
that of the broader legal process school as well. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 143-48 
(developing the concept of “reasoned elaboration”); see generally Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring 
Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 999 (1978) . Although it is not a central 
aim of this paper to advance an interpretative claim about Wechsler’s work, I do think that 
Kent Greenawalt’s influential interpretation of Wechsler may be wrong on a point relevant 
here. Greenawalt appears to take a view of Wechsler’s jurisprudence that conflates the concept 
of “neutrality” with that of “generality.” Greenawalt writes, “A person gives a neutral reason, in 
Wechsler's sense, if he states a basis for a decision that he would be willing to follow in other 
situations to which it applies.” Greenawalt, supra, at 985. First, this is not the usual idea we 
associate with “neutrality”; neutrality is usually understood to mean that one is not aligned with 
one side in a dispute. A basis for decision that one is willing to follow in other situations seems 
more naturally described as “general.” And, in fact, Wechsler says that “genuinely principled” 
decisions rest on “on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality.” Wechsler, supra, at 15 
(emphasis added). Since Wechsler distinguishes these ideas, one should prefer an interpretation 
of his work that does so as well. Greenawalt does give a separate definition of general 
principles—those that “reach out beyond the narrow circumstances of the case”—but the 
definition seems suspiciously close to neutral principles—those one is “willing to follow in 
other situations to which it applies.” Greenawalt, supra, at 987. Moreover, Wechsler says a 
variety of things that suggest he is thinking of neutrality in its normal sense. For example, he 
writes, “The man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result . . . acquiesces in 
the proposition that a man of different sympathy but equal information may no less properly conclude 
that he approves.” Wechsler, supra, at 12 (emphasis added); accord id. at 19 (without recourse to 
neutral principles, the constitution would, in Holmes’s words, “become the partisan of a 
particular set of ethical or economical opinions”). Greenawalt may have avoided emphasizing 
these passages in order to blunt a criticism of Wechsler common at the time: that finding 
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case—and, in the longer run, its institutional legitimacy—cannot take this 
requirement lightly.97 
While these considerations are perhaps common to a number of adjudicatory 
frameworks, they are considerably amplified in common-law adjudication by 
the process of deciding cases by precedent. This is because, in characterizing, 
applying, and distinguishing prior cases, common-law adjudication requires an 
ongoing evaluation of whether the reasons justifying a previously announced 
legal rule also apply to the case at hand. This is not a point about privileging 
“standards” or “principles” over legal rules;98 nor is it a point about “core” 
versus peripheral applications of legal rules or legal concepts.99 This is a point 
about the simple mechanics of applying precedent, as we normally think of this 
practice. The rule of a prior case applies to the present case only if the two 
cases are similar in relevant respects. But to determine whether shared facts are 
relevant, one must have a grasp of why and how a fact matters in justifying the 
court’s decision. For this reason, the common law is constantly engaged in 
determining whether a persuasive justification can be offered for binding the 
litigants before the court by rules generated in different contexts.100 
                                                                                                                        
“neutral” principles (in the normal sense) was “hopeless,” and that, by definition, it was 
impossible to remain “neutral” in adjudication. Christie, supra note 92, at 1312; see also 
Greenawalt, supra, at 991-92. Regardless of this dispute, however, perhaps the best thing to say 
is that neutrality—as it is commonly understood—and generality—are closely related concepts, 
and that Wechsler requires of judges only as much neutrality as is necessary to make the basis 
of their decisions applicable in other cases. I will discuss the ideas of objectivity and neutrality 
in greater depth in Part III.B, infra. 
97 See TYLER, supra note 6, at 172, 175 (“procedural justice” influences judgments of legitimacy, 
and the decision-making process itself is of central importance to judgments of procedural 
justice). In particular, the existence of a justification persuasive to the court’s heterogeneous 
audience is not a trivial matter. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 96, at 999 (“The litigants in a 
legal case, especially the losing one, have an important stake in reasoned justification. So also do 
the participants in other branches of government and the community at large. The disquiet that 
accompanies a widespread sense that power is not being legitimately exercised is itself an 
unfortunate social consequence; it may be followed by active steps to curb that power. Thus, it 
is vital that courts assure not only litigants but all those concerned with the integrity of the 
judicial process that decisions are grounded on sound bases.” ). 
98 For an example of the former point, see Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 847, 850-60 (1987) (situating Dworkin’s “law as integrity” in a broader tradition). 
Similarly, the point is not about the “rational” assessment of traditions embodied in the 
common law. See Strauss, supra note 22, at 894-95. 
99 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 19 (discussing H.L.A. Hart). 
100 T. R. S. Allan, Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason, in COMMON 
LAW THEORY 187-88 (Douglas E. Edlin, ed., 2007). For a critical account of the common law’s 
successes and failures to carry out this process, see Pound, supra note 23, at 22-24 (arguing that 
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Nearly every theory of precedent bears out this observation. To pick one 
example, Melvin Eisenberg argues that an “adopted-rule approach” to 
precedent—the view that a precedent is the rule explicitly announced by 
previous courts—is, generally speaking, both descriptively and normatively 
superior to the view that precedent is the result reached by previous courts, 
regardless of the rule announced.101 Nevertheless, Eisenberg says, in some 
instances courts will describe precedent as the result of previous cases, and then 
recharacterize the facts of those cases in order to “transform” the applicable 
legal rule.102 When the court does so, what it is doing, and what it should be 
doing, is examining the broader “social propositions”—common moral 
standards, policies, and empirical beliefs—that purport to justify a legal rule, in 
order to recast the rule in a superior way for the instant case.103 Thus, as 
Eisenberg understands the process of deciding cases by precedent, the court is 
constantly engaged in assessing precedent by determining whether the reasons 
justifying it (the “social propositions”) apply in the instant case.104 
The common law carries out this process of reasoned self-assessment through 
the dialogue, outlined above, between litigants and the court. This gives 
common-law adjudication a highly participatory dimension. Edward Levi’s 
discussion of this point is worth quoting at length: 
What does the law forum require? It requires the presentation of 
competing examples. The forum protects the parties and the 
community by making sure that the competing analogies are before the 
court. The rule which will be created arises out of a process in which if 
different things are to be treated as similar, at least the differences have 
been urged. In this sense the parties as well as the court participate in 
                                                                                                                        
the courts ought to weaken common-law economic liberties to account for changes in modern 
society). 
101 See Melvin A. Eisenbeg, The Principles of Legal Reasoning in the Common Law, in COMMON LAW 
THEORY 87-93 (Douglas E. Edlin, ed., 2007). 
102 Id. at 89. 
103 Id. at 92; see id. at 83 (defining “social proposition”).  
104 See id. at 92. Eisenberg offers a similar account of how courts do, and should, distinguish 
precedent See id. at 93-96. Other prominent accounts of decision by precedent and reasoning by 
analogy incorporate a similar process of examining the reasons for a legal rule to determine 
whether and how the rule should be applied in any instance. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 227-28, 229-32 (1986) (describing “law as integrity” and the “chain novel” view 
of decision by precedent); GOLDING, supra note 6, at 106-08 (reasoning by analogy incorporates 
a determination that a case is relevantly analogous and no “countervailing considerations” exist 
for applying the earlier rule in the instant case); see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 
52-53 (2006) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN ROBES] (describing “justificatory ascent”). 
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the law-making. In this sense, also, lawyers represent more than the 
litigants. 
Reasoning by example in the law is the key to many things. It indicates 
in part the hold which the law process has over the litigants. They have 
participated in the law-making. They are bound by something they 
helped to make. Moreover, examples or analogies urged by the parties 
bring into the law the common ideas of society. The ideas have their 
day in court, and the will have their day again. This is what makes the 
hearing fair . . . . [T]he hearing in a sense compels at least vicarious 
participation by all citizens, for the rule which is made, even though 
ambiguous, will be law as to them.105 
In short, says Levi, common-law adjudication allows those bound by the law to 
participate in its making by appearing before the court to argue why precedent 
ought, or ought not, to apply to their particular case. 
Levi identifies several important implications of this practice. First, it ensures 
that the rules of the substantive common law will be thoroughly tested by an 
ongoing examination of how the rule applies to particular cases. The audience 
to whom the application of a legal rule must be persuasively justified is thus 
quite large, consisting not only of the diverse views of any one moment, but 
through time, as views evolve in response to changing conditions. Second, the 
participatory nature of the common law gives it a kind of political legitimacy, 
since those bound by its decisions are permitted to appear before the court and 
urge their view of the law. Crucially, since urging one’s view of the law consists 
merely in offering reasons, an appearance before this forum is something that 
everyone is capable of using to their advantage. This contrasts with law-making 
forums in which influence depends on bargaining or strategic considerations, 
where one’s influence is directly limited by resources. 
Participation in a fair adjudicative process is not a trivial matter, but is critical to 
the institutional legitimacy of the court. Leading social science accounts show 
that individuals care deeply about legal procedures and the decision-making 
processes they incorporate.106 The “instrumentalist” assumption that concern 
for fair procedures is borne out of an interest in controlling the outcome of a 
legal process appears for the most part unfounded; there is a strong interest in 
procedural justice independent of “outcome control,” and this interest does not 
                                                
105 LEVI, supra note 81, at 5; accord Fuller, supra note 89, at 364. 
106 TYLER, supra note 6, at 94-104; see id. at 172 (“”The Chicago study supports the widespread 
view that the evaluation of authorities and institutions is shared by concerns about procedural 
justice.”). 
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disappear as the outcomes increase in importance.107 Rather, judgments about 
procedural justice are strongly influenced by opportunities to present one’s 
views to the authorities, as well as the authorities’ lack of bias, honesty, 
“ethicality,” and motivation, and the ultimate quality of their decisions.108 
Moreover, not only is the opportunity to speak significant, but other aspects of 
adjudicatory participation are meaningful as well; individuals report concern 
with whether the authority listens, responds to their concerns, and tries to be 
fair.109 In short, judgments about the legitimacy of procedure appear to depend 
in large part on their opportunities to participate in the ideal practice described 
above, in which individuals exchange objective or neutral reasons in support of 
their desired outcome. 
Nevertheless, one reaction to the normative account offered above is to regard 
it as unrealistic. Both lawyers and judges have incentives to act in ways 
contradictory to the practices described above. Lawyers, it has been said, “sow 
confusion and delay.” They may have little incentive to help the court uncover 
the truth, because doing so would not promote the interests of their clients.110 
Judges may not have the opportunity to uncover the strategic conduct of 
counsel, and may be more concerned themselves about quickly and efficiently 
resolving a case.111 While the account above need not incorporate the full range 
of strategic and instrumental conduct common in adjudication, it cannot be 
Pollyannaish; it must describe a recognizable ideal of the actual common-law 
process. There are two answers to these concerns. The first is that the strategic 
conduct of attorneys (and even judges) is not inconsistent with the norms 
described above. Both sets of incentives may be present; they simply conflict. 
In some cases, the incentive for strategic conduct may outweigh the incentives 
generated by the public exchange of reasons in adjudication. In other cases, the 
balance may tilt in the opposite direction. The second answer is that, to some 
extent, the adjudicatory norms described above function to circumscribe the 
strategic conduct of counsel, by subjecting them to the test of public argument. 
                                                
107 Id. at 105-06, 115-30, 146-47. 
108 Id. at 137; see also id. at 126-30 (finding that (1) judgments that one has control over the legal 
process effect the experience of legitimacy much more than judgments that one has control 
over the outcome, and (2) the consideration of people’s views and efforts to be fair are key to 
judgments about control over process). 
109 Id. at 137 (“People believe that decisions should be made by neutral, unbiased decision 
makers, and they expect the decision makers to be honest and to make their decisions based on 
objective information about the issues. People also feel that procedures are fairer when they 
believe they have had some control in the decision-making procedure. Such control includes 
having the opportunity to present one’s arguments, being listened to, and having one’s views 
considered.”); id. at 138, 149, 151.  
110 See Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism 243-44 (2001). 
111 TYLER, supra note 6, at 156. 
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While the judge may not have the resources to uncover strategic action, 
opposing counsel often does, and counsel has a strong incentive to enforce the 
rules of litigation against opponents. Much strategic action cannot survive the 
light of day, and thus the public process of exchanging reasons has the natural 
effect of limiting it. 
C.  An “Epistemic  Theory” o f  Common-law Adjudicat ion 
I want to return to a point made above about the necessary breadth of legal 
justifications. The point was that because legal justifications are directed to a 
heterogeneous audience, they must appeal to broad, objective, or neutral 
reasons—reasons that individuals with diverse views of the law could find 
compelling. The idea that judges should give “objective” or “neutral” reasons in 
support of their decisions has been roundly criticized as unrealistic or 
impossible. Can we give substance to the idea of objective reasons in a way that 
doesn’t suffer from these defects? 
Consider that there is a lot of doubt about whether our judgments of the law 
are what they purport to be. By “judgments of the law,” I mean our thoughts 
and statements about the content of the law, and about whether the law 
permits or requires particular relief requested by litigants, as in the discussion 
above. The doubt about these judgments is that while they may appear to 
reflect the determinate application of preexisting legal rules, they do not.112 This 
doubt is usually put in terms of “constraint” or the absence of constraint 
imposed by precedent, but it can be framed in other ways as well. For instance, 
we can doubt that our legal judgments answer to the facts, and suspect that 
their appearance of doing so is simply an error.113 Our judgments “answer to 
the facts” in the relevant sense if what makes them true or not is the world, and 
not our own preferences, dispositions, or values. 
Yet legal judgments at least purport to answer to the facts, namely, to the facts 
about the law. The world contains legal institutions, practices, statutes and 
judicial opinions. Our legal judgments purport to answer to the facts about 
these things, and in particular, to the facts about what might be called their 
content. In this respect, our legal judgments present themselves as an ordinary 
species of knowledge about the world. For it is also a fundamental idea about 
                                                
112 See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 81, at 1 (discussing the “pretense” of legal reasoning). 
113 See JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 104, at 50 (“So what in the world makes a claim, about 
what the law is on some matter, true or false?”). This way of framing the issue seems to suggest 
that legal reasoning is a species of theoretical reasoning, not practical reasoning. In other words, 
legal reasoning on this view is concerned primarily with the truth of a claim about the law, as 
opposed to the desirability of a certain course of action. 
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knowledge that it purports to answer to the facts in this sense. As Bernard 
Williams observed, “if knowledge is what it claims to be, then it is knowledge 
of a reality which exists independently of that knowledge. Knowledge is of what 
there is anyway.”114 
Recognizing this point helps to make sense of the idea of “objectivity” above. 
As a species of knowledge, legal judgments exhibit a number of distinctive 
features. When I assert that the law supports granting the relief a party requests, 
we might say that I purport to “represent” the content of the law. Yet as 
Williams has shown, if I am doing any such thing, it must be possible to show 
how the facts about the law make my judgment true.115 It must be possible to 
“stand back,” to form a “conception” which contains my previous judgment, 
and to articulate why the facts make that judgment true. The reasons I give in 
support of my judgment will be “broader” than the judgment itself in the sense 
that they are from a broader point of view—the “standpoint” from which I can 
articulate why one, situated as I am, should have made precisely the legal 
judgment I made in light of the facts.116 The reasons must be broader, because 
only a broader point of view will enable me to show how the facts made my 
judgment true. In other words, only broader reasons will enable me to make 
good on my claims to legal knowledge.117 
We employ this technique in attempting to justify a legal judgment to a 
heterogeneous audience with diverse views of the law. Where persons A and B 
differ in their view of whether the defendant is liable, for example, on a theory 
                                                
114 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry 48 (2005 ed.) [hereinafter 
Descartes]; see also Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 138-39 (1985); cf. 
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 4-12 (1986). For a sophisticated treatment of 
Williams’s argument, see Adrian Moore, Points of View 2-77 (1997). 
115 DESCARTES, supra note 114, at 49. 
116 See MOORE, supra note 114, at 6 (defining “point of view”); NAGEL, supra note 114, at 4. The 
idea of breadth here appears to differ from Schauer’s account of “generality” in Giving Reasons 
and elsewhere. See Giving Reasons, supra note 84, at 638-42. According to Schauer, “That 
principle p is less general than principle q says nothing about subsumption, instantiation, or 
individuation, nothing about induction or deduction, and nothing about how, if at all, one gets 
from p to q, or from q to p.” Id. at 639. If that is the case, however, I do not see how generality 
can explain anything about our practice of giving reasons in justification of our legal judgments, 
since that practice aims precisely at the inferences mentioned by Schauer, in order to show 
others why they ought to accept our conclusion. 
117 This process bears some similarity to what Dworkin has described as “justificatory ascent.” 
See JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 104, at 53-54, 81. However, justificatory ascent appears to 
capture the challenge to our legal judgments that “ascending” to higher levels of generality can 
create. See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 13. In contrast, the idea here is that we often support 
our legal judgments by adducing reasons of greater generality or breadth than the judgments 
they justify. 
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of res ipsa loquitur, and A wishes to persuade B that the defendant’s conduct 
does, in fact, give rise to liability, he does so by beginning from common 
ground. A “stands back,” in Williams’s words, from his particular view of res 
ipsa, and rests his argument in favor of liability on shared beliefs about the 
doctrine.118 In other words, A takes a broader point of view on the law. By 
engaging B from this point of view, A aims to earn B’s unforced agreement by 
showing B how the facts about the defendant’s conduct and the law justify a 
determination of liability.119 In settings where obtaining B’s unforced agreement 
is highly significant, such as adjudication, A can demonstrate the legitimacy of 
his request by invoking our techniques for assessing claims to knowledge.120 
The common law institutionalizes exchanges such as these, and in so doing 
incorporates one of our most familiar epistemic practices. This insight is the 
basis of what we might call an “epistemic theory of the common law.” 
According to that theory, the norms of common-law adjudication encourage an 
exchange of reasons between litigants and the court, offered in justification for 
the court’s decision, which characterizes our normal practice of making and 
assessing judgments about the world. An implication of this theory is that to 
the extent our normal practices enable us to demonstrate an entitlement to our 
claims about the world, the common law enables us to demonstrate an 
entitlement to our claims about the law, and about whether the law supports 
the relief a litigant requests. Where the common law succeeds in justifying the 
court’s decision to those affected by it, the decision enjoys the concomitant 
legitimacy that our judgments enjoy when we can articulate to others how they 
are made true by the facts—that is, when we can show why they deserve the 
title “knowledge.” Invested with this legitimacy, they provide a natural basis for 
social cooperation. 
                                                
118 See Fred D’Agostino, Transcendence and Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity, 30 AM. PHIL. 
QUARTERLY 87, 99-100 (1993) (“How . . . are we to guard against (inappropriately) parochial 
judgments? . . . We are to do so, I believe, ‘conversationally’—that is, by a process in which 
each of the individuals involved articulates h/er grounds for judgment, listens to the others 
articulate their ground for judgment, offers and responds to objections to these considerations, 
and so on; the process ending, at least sometimes, in an agreement in judgments which suffices 
to resolve the dispute or to facilitate the coordination of social action.”). 
119 Another possibility, of course, is that like A and B in Williams’s example, standing back will 
reveal that both of us are entitled to our legal judgments. 
120 Id. at 100 (“How are we to find an authoritative basis for the resolution of disputes and the 
coordination of social activities? We will try to do so . . . by trying, conversationally, to find 
points of agreement which are adequate to the task at hand (whatever that might be). . . . [A]ny 
result that is achieved in this way carries authority, for those who’ve participated in its 
achievement, [because] compliance or assent [was achieved] on grounds distinct from coercive 
power.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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IV. ESCOLA V.  COCA COLA BOTTLING CO. OF FRESNO 
To better appreciate how these considerations play out in the common-law 
context, consider Justice Traynor’s concurrence in Escola. Plaintiff in Escola was 
injured when a Coke bottle exploded in her hand as she moved it from its 
delivery case to a refrigerator.121 She alleged negligence on a theory of res ipsa 
loquitur because, as she conceded, she “ha[d] no way of showing any specific act 
of negligence.”122 By itself, of course, this did not pose an insurmountable 
problem; res ipsa had been accepted in California for some time.123 The problem 
was that res ipsa required the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance that the 
accident was one that did not normally occur absent negligence.124 This 
requirement, which was well entrenched in the doctrine, had been fatal to a 
similar exploding-bottle case heard in the supreme court only a year before.125 
In that case, Honea v. City Dairy, the court had reversed judgment for the 
plaintiff on the grounds that there was no evidence that a reasonable inspection 
would have discovered the defect in the glass that caused the accident.126 
Writing for the Escola majority, Chief Justice Gibson affirmed judgment for the 
plaintiff by distinguishing Honea.127 The opinion pointed to expert testimony 
that the Coke bottle manufacturer, who supplied bottles to the defendant 
bottler, tested for flaws in the glass by subjecting one out of every 600 bottles 
to pressure and thermal shock tests—tests that were, according to the witness, 
“pretty near infallible.”128 No such evidence had been introduced in Honea.129 
Because the manufacturer in Escola subjected its Coke bottles to “near 
infallible” tests for hidden defects, the majority reasoned, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that it was unlikely the bottles contained such defects 
                                                
121 (“Escola II”), 150 P.2d at 438. 
122 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (“Escola I”), 140 P.2d 107, 108 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1943). 
123 See, e.g., Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 556, 40 P. 1020, 1021 (1895); Hill v. Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co., 22 Cal. App. 788, 790, 136 P. 492, 494 (Dist. Ct. App. 1913); William L. 
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183, 188 (1949) (tracing the doctrine back 
to Judson and earlier cases). 
124 E.g., Hill, 136 P. at 494; see also Prosser, supra note 123, at 194 (“It is the plaintiff’s task to 
make out a case to make out a case from which, on the basis of experience, the jury may draw 
the conclusion that negligence is the most likely explanation of the accident.”). 
125 See Honea v. City Dairy, 22 Cal. 2d 614, 617-21, 140 P.2d 369, 370-73 (1943). 
126 Id. at 371 (“While the dairy may have had a duty to make an examination of all bottles, 
whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers, it is not responsible for defects that 
cannot be found by a reasonable, practicable inspection.”). 
127 Escola II, 150 P.2d at 439-40. 
128 Id. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Honea, 140 P.2d at 371 (refusing to take judicial notice of testing methods). 
THE JOURNAL JURISPRUDENCE 
(2011) J. JURIS 466 
when delivered to the defendant bottler.130 From this it followed that the 
explosion likely would not have occurred absent the bottler’s failure either to 
perform reasonable inspections for visible defects or to appropriately charge 
the bottle with soda—both of which would constitute negligence.131 
The reasoning of the majority is certainly plausible on its face. However, a 
closer look at the case shows that the majority’s opinion fails to justify its 
conclusion. Even if the bottles left the manufacturer free from hidden defects, 
there is no reasonable basis for inferring that the bottler was at fault for hidden 
defects that existed in the bottle by the time it reached the plaintiff.132 To bridge 
the gap, the majority suggested that “it may be inferred that defects not 
discoverable by visual inspection do not develop in bottles after they are 
manufactured.”133 This, of course, is a tendentious assumption when applying a 
theory of liability premised on the defendant’s responsibility for the condition of 
the object that caused the injury.134 But even if the assumption were justified 
and true, the jury could still only speculate that the defective bottle reached the 
plaintiff due to the defendant’s failure to exercise due care. There was no 
evidence tending to show that any flaw undetectable by the manufacturer would 
be visible.135 The defect that caused the bottle to explode may have been 
undetectable by both the manufacturer and the bottler’s reasonable inspections. 
In short—just as the court below had concluded—the explosion may not have 
evidenced negligence.136 
                                                
130 Escola II, 150 P.2d at 440. 
131 Id 
132 Cf. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict Liability for the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 
1099, 1116 (1960) (“The cracked Coca Cola Bottle may have been cracked long after it left the 
plant.”) (citing cases). 
133 Escola II, 150 P.2d at 440. 
134 See id. at 438 (discussing the first element of res ipsa loquitur). 
135 The California District Court of Appeal, which had reversed the plaintiff’s judgment, was 
inclined towards this view. See Escola I, 140 P.2d at 108 (“The difficulty in attempting to affirm 
the present judgment is that the reviewing court is not presented with any evidence of 
negligence on defendant’s part . . . .”).  
136 Id. The expert’s testimony does not show that the bottle’s explosion evidenced negligence. 
See Escola II, 150 P.2d at 440. The expert testified that the bottles were tested using pressure and 
thermal shock tests, which were nearly infallible. The majority implies that these tests detected 
all hidden flaws in the glass. Id. (“Since Coca Cola bottles are subjected to these tests by the 
manufacturer, it is not likely that they contain defects when delivered to the bottler which are 
not discoverable by visual inspection.”). But there is no evidentiary basis for this inference. The 
only reasonable understanding of the expert’s testimony, as reported by the court, is that the 
manufacturer tested for flaws in glass bottles by using pressure and thermal shock tests, and 
that those tests were highly effective in detecting flaws. Yet other sorts of hidden flaws may not 
have been detectible by reasonable tests at that time, or may have been detectible by reasonable 
tests, but not the pressure and thermal shock tests employed by the manufacturer. 
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As this analysis suggests, applying res ipsa in cases like Escola faced two 
significant challenges. First, where the product causing the injury passed 
through the control of several parties, each of which modified it, establishing 
any one defendant’s responsibility for the condition of the product was 
difficult.137 Second, even where the product caused injury by grossly 
malfunctioning, the complexity of the manufacturing process meant that 
inferring probable negligence could be highly questionable. These were not 
cases of a barrel rolling out a second-story window and falling onto the street, 
or the discovery of severed toes in a can of chewing tobacco.138 Even under 
theories of inferred negligence, the modern manufacturing process made 
recovery difficult.139 
Justice Traynor was aware of these challenges and the unpersuasive use of res 
ipsa that resulted. As he described the situation years later, a concern for 
product safety had “led to the invocation of res ipsa loquitur to permit an 
inference of negligence from the presence of a defect in cases where there was 
hardly a basis in common experience for concluding that a defect was probably 
caused by negligence.”140 His strategy in Escola was to acknowledge these 
                                                
137 Rules of joint liability might be invoked, except where other defendants are able to obtain 
dismissal on the pleadings. In Escola, where this occurred, the majority opinion took up the 
issue of control even though the bottling company did not raise it on cross-appeal. Although res 
ipsa had been traditionally formulated as requiring the defendant’s exclusive control over the 
instrumentality of injury, “the more logical view,” thought the court, required the plaintiff only 
to “prove[] that the condition of the instrumentality had not been changed after it left the 
defendant's possession.” Escola II, 150 P.2d at 438. This modification, of course, was almost 
always necessary for recovery in the product liability context. 
138 Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863) (falling barrel); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 
Miss. 490, 500, 78 So. 365, 366 (1918) (toes in tobacco), cited in Prosser, supra note 123, at 220. 
139 See Prosser, supra note 132, at 1116-17 (arguing that res ipsa could fail to permit recovery 
because, among other things, the product causing the injury “will pass through the hands of a 
whole line of other dealers, and the plaintiff may have good reason to sue any or all of them. 
The manufacturer is often beyond the jurisdiction. He may even, in some cases, be unknown. If 
he is identified and can be sued, it is very often impossible to pin the liability upon him. Even 
where there is a proved defect which speaks of obvious negligence on the part of some one, it 
may still not be possible to prove that it was on the part of the maker.” (internal footnotes 
omitted)). I am going to bypass the larger historical questions about social, economic and 
intellectual causes of the development of a strict liability standard in products liability cases, see 
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of 
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462-65 (1985) (identifying several scholarly 
approaches to the development of products liability), as well as the question of whether there is 
a good case for strict liability today, see generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the 
Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993). 
140 Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. 
L. REV. 363, 364 (1965). 
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difficulties, and to use them to build a case for strict liability. In the second 
paragraph of the concurrence, Traynor wrote: 
The injury from a defective product does not become a matter of 
indifference because the defect arises from causes other than the 
negligence of the manufacturer, such as negligence of a 
submanufacturer of a component part whose defects could not be 
revealed by inspection, or unknown causes that even by the device of 
res ipsa loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer. 
The inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing 
of proper care. . . . An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a 
position to refute such evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for 
he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the 
manufacturer himself is.141 
The limits of res ipsa would be of little concern, had the state no interest in 
preventing non-negligent product injuries. But, reasoned Traynor, the state does 
have an interest in preventing such injuries. Injury from a defective product 
“does not become a matter of indifference” because the manufacturer used due 
care. 
Crucially, Traynor’s principal support for this claim is in the material that follows 
it—a lengthy discussion of existing products liability doctrine in California—
and not the brief public policy discussion that precedes it. In other words, 
Traynor’s primary argument is that California has an interest in preventing and 
redressing injury caused by defective products as expressed in existing law. He cites 
four examples: (1) the doctrine of res ipsa, which, although limited, can function 
as strict liability by entitling the plaintiff to go to the jury on a presumption of 
negligence; (2) the strict liability criminal statute that prohibits the manufacture 
and distribution of adulterated food; (3) the doctrine of implied warranty of 
safety, which is a form of absolute liability of manufacturer to merchant, and 
merchant to consumer; (4) and the judge-made law implying a warranty of 
safety for food products between manufacturer and consumer, despite an 
absence of contract between them.142 
In effect, California already had a policy of strict liability to the consumer for 
injuries caused by defective products. But as things stood when Escola was 
decided in 1944, the law implementing this policy had the look of a patchwork 
                                                
141 Escola II, 150 P.2d at 441 (internal citations omitted); cf. id. at 443 (“Manufacturing processes, 
frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible or beyond the ken of the general 
public.”). 
142 Id. at 441-42. 
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quilt. The exceptions and intricacies of the applicable doctrine, including res 
ipsa, generated distinctions where there should be none.143 In light of existing 
California law, it made little sense for Gladys Escola’s recovery to turn on 
whether she was able to prove, by a preponderance, those particular defects a 
bottling company’s reasonable inspection and testing processes should 
discover. Instead of continuing to force judgment into theories like res ipsa, 
where the fit was less than comfortable, Traynor wanted to “fix that 
responsibility openly.”144 In short, the situation called not for distinguishing 
Honea v. City Dairy, as the majority had done, but for overruling it. 
To be sure, this is not the only argument of the Escola concurrence. 
Undoubtedly, Traynor’s larger aim was to unsettle the assumption that a liability 
standard of due care appropriately balanced losses caused by defective products 
between the injured party and society.145 The discussion of existing California 
law does this. But the public policy arguments that open the concurrence also 
promote this aim, as do the observations at the opinion’s close about the 
altered relationship between manufacturer and consumer in modern systems of 
manufacturing and distribution.146 By introducing the policy arguments in a 
non-binding opinion, Traynor ensured that a public discussion of the wisdom 
of strict liability would take place before the California Supreme Court put any 
such rule into effect. 
This view of Escola is consistent with themes in Justice Traynor’s own 
reflections on judicial decision-making. Traynor acknowledged on many 
occasions that judges have a creative role in lawmaking.147 Yet Traynor’s vision 
of this role was limited in an important sense. Traynor’s judicial ideal—the 
“reasoning judge”—exercised creativity primarily in keeping “the inevitable 
                                                
143 Traynor’s discussion of the California criminal statute making manufacturers strictly liable 
for injuries caused by adulterated foodstuffs is another example of this point. The statute 
prohibited the “manufacturing, preparing, compounding, packing, selling, offering for sale, or 
keeping for sale, or advertising within the state, of any adulterated food.” Id. at 441 (citing Cal. 
Health & Safety Code § 26470). There was at least a colorable argument that this statute applied 
to an exploding Coke bottle. Id. Yet there is something strange about hinging liability on this 
determination, given that the statute appears to evidence a much broader public policy. See id. 
144 Id. at 441. 
145 See Traynor, supra note 140, at 366-67 (listing the reasons justifying strict liability).  
146 See Escola II, 150 P.2d at 443-44. 
147 Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and 
Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267, 1308 (2009); see, e.g., Roger J. 
Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) [hereinafter Judicial 
Creativity] (the judge is necessarily an “active analyst”); Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social 
Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232 [hereinafter Law and Social 
Change].  
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evolution of the law on a rational course.”148 This task included overruling 
precedents when they became “riddled with exceptions,”149 just as Traynor 
wanted to do in Escola. But in laying out new rules, and in shaping existing 
rules, the judge was limited by the burden of justifying the law’s direction to the 
litigants and to society at large.150 In proceeding slowly and carefully, and in 
attending primarily to whether judge-made legal rules could be appropriately 
justified in light of the contemporary conditions to which they were applied, the 
judge’s creative law-making role was distinguished from that of the legislator.151 
Justice Traynor largely carried out this judicial role in Escola. There, his primary 
argument was that it made little sense to tie liability for injuries caused by 
defective products to the doctrine of res ipsa, when California already made 
manufacturers strictly liable, in large part, for such injuries. In light of the 
changed relationship between consumers and manufactures, the law had already 
developed to impose obligations on the manufacturer more stringent than 
those traditionally imposed at common law. Recognizing a uniform rule of 
strict liability to the consumer would put these developments “on a rational 
course,” and enable courts to dispense with the artful practice of maneuvering a 
case into a recognized pocket of liability. This practice simply made little sense 
in light of the strong policy arguments, in Traynor’s view, for imposing a 
                                                
148 Judicial Creativity, supra note 147, at 7. 
149 Id. at 5; Law and Social Change, supra note 147, at 236 (“We do a great disservice to the law 
when we neglect that careful pruning on which its vigorous growth depends and let it become 
sickled over with nice rules that fail to meet the problems of real people.”). 
150 Judicial Creativity, supra note 147, at 5-6; Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 
49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 621 (1961) (“A judge needs no more than forthrightness to make an 
overdue statement of the obvious. He may be deterred, however, by the prospect of also having 
to explain why it was not always so obvious, or if it was why it failed of earlier recognition. 
Never forget that his explanation must persuade his colleagues, make sense to the bar, pass 
muster with the scholars, and if possible allay the suspicion of any man in the street who 
regards knowledge of the law as no excuse for making it.” (quotation marks and footnote 
omitted)). 
151 See Law and Social Change, supra note 147, at 239 (“A judge who mediates law and social 
change in a democratic society is bound to be preoccupied with the role of the courts. 
Nevertheless he is bound also to recognize that the task of law reform is that of the legislators, 
which is to say primarily that of the people. . . . However sensitive judges become to the need 
for law reform to match our spectacular growth, they must necessarily keep their dispassionate 
distance from that ball of fire that is the living law, and hope for wisdom to give it coherent 
direction when it spins their way.”); see also Judicial Creativity, supra note 147, at 11. But see Ursin, 
supra note 147, at 1308 (suggesting that Traynor took a broader view of judicial creativity that 
“emphasized not democratic theory but the practical necessity of judicial innovation to meet 
constantly changing conditions and values”). In my view, Ursin overstates this aspect of 
Traynor’s account of judicial decision-making. Ursin inexplicably injects passages from Judge 
Posner’s work into his analysis of Traynor, projecting Posner’s view of judicial decision-making 
onto Traynor and thereby amplifying certain themes in Traynor’s work. See id. at 1314-29. 
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regime of strict liability, and in light of the fundamental changes that had 
occurred in the manufacturing and distribution of products. This was, in effect, 
Traynor’s “trial” justification, aimed at prospective litigants, and at the 
California public at large, for the judicial recognition of a new standard of 
liability. 
V. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMON LAW 
The normative features of common-law adjudication described above are also 
present in the process of collective decision-making that legitimates enacted 
law. In both cases, legitimacy turns on participation in a specialized kind of 
deliberation. To some extent, the legitimating effects of this process are more 
obvious in the context of judicial proceedings than legislative proceedings or 
broader public discussions over the merits and demerits of a course of 
collective action. The deliberative theory of democracy is a significant because 
it shows how processes of enactment—which we typically identify with 
democracy—actually depend on public deliberation in order to fully legitimate 
the enacted law that results. 
A.  A Del iberat ive  Theory o f  Democracy 
“The fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the authorization to 
exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of 
society who are governed by that power.”152 The deliberative theory of 
democracy naturally explains why collective decisions have this effect.153 
According to the deliberative theory, collective decisions legitimate the exercise 
of state power when they arise out of an ideal deliberative procedure, described as 
“free public reasoning among equals.”154 The envisioned procedure is 
“deliberative” insofar as it is characterized by an exchange of reasons for and 
against proposed policies.155 But that does not exhaust its content. In what 
                                                
152 Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 95; accord Joshua Cohen, Reflections on Deliberative 
Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY: SELECTED ESSAYS 329 (2009) [hereinafter 
Reflections] (“Democracy is a way of making collective decisions that connects decisions to the 
interests and the judgments of those whose conduct is to be regulated by the decisions.”). 
153 See Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 95-96. 
154 Id. at 99; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 73 (James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy]; James Bohman & William Rehg, Introduction, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS ix (James Bohman & William 
Rehg., eds., 1997) (“Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate 
lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens.”). 
155 Rawls, supra note 5, at 138 (“The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of 
deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting 
reasons concerning public political questions.”); see also Reflections, supra note 152, at 329 
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follows, I will lay out the features of the ideal deliberative procedure that 
explain how collective decisions can have a legitimating effect on state action. 
These features should be familiar from the discussion of the common law. 
First, the ideal deliberative procedure aims at political justification.156 This is 
distinct from the idea of legitimacy mentioned above. Showing how collective 
decisions produce legitimate law is, of course, a desideratum of any normative 
democratic theory. Any democratic theory will need to explain how and why 
the institutions, rights and norms typical of democratic constitutional regimes 
produce legitimate state action.157 What distinguishes the deliberative theory is 
that it draws a natural connection between the problem of legitimacy and the 
more familiar task of justifying one’s beliefs or actions to others.158 In response 
to the citizen’s question, Why ought I abide by the state’s command to do A?, the 
deliberative theorist imagines the task of adducing reasons that the citizen would 
reasonably regard as justifying the collective policy.159 State action will be 
legitimate if it is reasonably justified to all those affected. This basic principle 
has several important implications. First, it implies that the ideal deliberative 
procedure must amount to more than the political argle-bargle familiar from 
television; while vigorous public discussion has an obvious value to democracy, 
it may not (and often does not) involve an exchange of reasons aimed at 
justifying a policy.160 Second, the idea of political justification excludes “social 
choice” accounts of the political process, based on bargaining or strategic 
                                                                                                                        
(“Deliberation, generically understood, is about weighing the reasons relevant to a decision with 
a view to making a decision on the basis of that weighing.”). In another paper, Cohen suggested 
that agenda setting and solution proposal were also part of the deliberative process. Deliberation 
and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 154, at 73. 
156 Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 99-100 (arguing that the ideal procedure of political 
deliberation is a conception of political justification). 
157 This is not a trivial task for purely procedural theories of democracy, which may tolerate 
unjust and immoral state action where that action arises out of a democratic procedure. 
158 See Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 101 (suggesting that, because it focuses on political 
justification, the deliberative view of democracy presents a compelling account of why 
democratic law is legitimate); cf. Rawls, supra note 5, at 137 (“Thus when . . . all appropriate 
government officials act from and follow public reason, all when all reasonable citizens think of 
themselves ideally as if they were legislators following public reason, the legal enactment 
expressing the opinion of the majority is legitimate law.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 217 (expanded ed. 2005) (similar). 
159 Notice that the task here is not the task of deriving particular laws from the principles of 
justice describing the fair terms of social cooperation. Rather, the deliberative procedure begins 
with the proposed policy, and seeks to justify the policy by adducing reasons shared by the 
deliberants. As I understand it, this largely blunts the problem of indeterminacy of norms. 
160 E.g., Reflections, supra note 152, at 330 (“[N]or does [deliberative democracy] aim to subject 
power to the discipline—such as it is—of talking, because talking is not the same as reasoning . 
. . .”). 
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action between mutually opposed interest groups whose conduct is best 
understood as an effort to realize their particular preferences.161 
Second, deliberation will legitimate state action only if it is carried out under 
appropriate conditions. 162 Deliberation can and does occur in many different 
settings. Forms of government other than democracy may employ deliberation 
to test the wisdom of public policies. As Josh Cohen has pointed out, “a 
committee of oligarchs can deliberate.”163 Obviously, the deliberation of 
oligarchs does not invest the laws with democratic legitimacy. What is missing 
from the example is a particular institutional and normative framework. 
Unlike oligarchy and its relative, aristocracy, democracy is a form of 
government in which individuals are treated as political equals. This requirement 
applies to the conditions of deliberation, and, in ways I will shortly explain, is 
necessary if deliberation is to have a legitimating force. Generally speaking, 
deliberative participants are treated as equals when deliberation is conducted in 
accordance with procedures and under substantive conditions that effect an 
equal distribution of power.164 As Cohen has usefully summarized the idea, 
individuals must be equals in the process of making decisions.165 This means that the 
institutional framework in which deliberation is conducted must be structured 
to ensure that individuals have an equal opportunity to participate, that resource 
inequities do not undermine this opportunity for some and, eo ipso, dramatically 
inflate it for others, and that the interests and reasons of each participant are 
equally taken into consideration. 
Deliberation must also be free to legitimate state action. Generally speaking, free 
deliberation is deliberation bound only by the norms of argument, and which 
gives rise, in the usual ways, to changes in belief and to action. This means, 
principally, that free deliberation is “not constrained by the authority of prior 
norms or requirements.”166 For example, a participant’s political status cannot 
depend on his ascribing to certain fundamental beliefs or values, which in turn 
                                                
161 See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 11-12 (James Bohman & William Rehg., eds., 
1997) (contrasting social choice theory with Habermas’s discourse theory).  
162 See Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 154, at 74 (arguing that ideal deliberation is 
free and the parties are formally and substantive equal). 
163 Reflections, supra note 152, at 329. Of course, I will consider below whether a panel of judges 
is a “committee of oligarchs” in Cohen’s sense. 
164 Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 154, at 74. 
165 Reflections, supra note 152, at 329. 
166 Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 154, at 74. 
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provide an unrevisable starting point for political deliberation.167 Rather, 
participants in free deliberation regard themselves as being independently 
capable of evaluating practical and theoretical arguments according to whatever 
reasonable assumptions they find best. They are free to draw reasonable 
conclusions, and they are free to act where the conclusions supply a sufficient 
reason to act.168 
When deliberation is free and the participants treated as equals—when it is 
carried out under the conditions described above—then each participant must 
direct his argument to affected parties, by adducing reasons that those parties 
will regard as justifying the policy in question.169 As Rawls has observed, 
“Public reasoning aims for public justification. . . . Public justification is not 
simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from 
premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we 
think they could also reasonably accept.”170 This result follows closely from the 
conditions discussed above. If we regard our deliberative partners as our equals, 
not only must we afford them an equal opportunity to speak, but we must treat 
them as being equally deserving of persuasion. Equals in deliberation are equally 
entitled to the reasonable assumptions they bring to the argument. When two 
equals engage each other in argument, they recognize this mutual entitlement 
by searching out common ground, instead of asking each other to give up their 
assumptions. Moreover, given that deliberants are free to reject arguments that 
they reasonably judge unpersuasive, we cannot simply wall off some deliberants 
and ignore their concerns.171 This means that political deliberation must consist 
in an exchange of reasons that each of us can reasonably regard as being 
compelling.172 Otherwise, deliberation cannot legitimate state action. 
                                                
167 See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 21-22. Rawls speaks of individuals as free, but I understand the 
idea to be very close to Cohen’s concept of free deliberation. 
168 Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra note 154, at 74. 
169 Reflections, supra note 152, at 330 (“Deliberative democracy is about reasoning together 
among equals, and that means not simply advancing considerations that one judges to be 
reasons but also finding considerations that others can reasonably be expected to acknowledge 
as reasons.”). 
170 Rawls, supra note 5, at 155 (emphasis added). 
171 There are certain obvious exceptions to this generalization. We need not persuade those 
who do not accept, for example, the validity of a democratic constitutional government. See id. 
at 132. 
172 E.g., Reflections, supra note 152, at 330 (“Deliberative democracy is about reasoning together 
among equals, and that means not simply advancing considerations that one judges to be 
reasons but also finding considerations that others can reasonably be expected to acknowledge 
as reasons.”). As Rawls and Cohen use the term, this makes political argument concerned with 
the common good, as opposed to narrow considerations of self-interest. See id. 
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The last feature of the ideal deliberative procedure is the diversity of its 
participants. Deliberation in a democracy takes place under conditions of 
fundamental diversity. This diversity—what Rawls has famously called the “fact 
of reasonable pluralism”—is endemic to democratic constitutional regimes, 
which enjoy a “culture of free institutions” that fosters diverse fundamental 
commitments.173 Strong traditions of political liberty also associated with 
democratic regimes—principally, rights of free speech, free association, and 
religious liberty—predictably strengthen and protect this pluralism.174 Nor are 
there philosophical reasons to think that the application of “practical reason” 
ought to eliminate it.175 In short, fundamental diversity is here to stay. But 
because an individual’s fundamental beliefs and values naturally influence her 
evaluation of political argument, fundamental diversity limits the pool of 
reasons we can draw on in attempting to justify collective decisions to others. 
What remains is “public reason”: the body of reasons we can reasonably regard 
as being compelling to all citizens.176 
In this way, a process of free public reasoning among equals produces a 
political justification that each person affected can reasonably regard as being 
compelling. So justified, state action is legitimate. This does not mean, of 
course, that deliberative democracy requires consensus to legitimate state 
action.177 Consensus on disputed matters of sufficient complexity is likely 
impossible, even under ideal deliberative conditions. Reasonable deliberants 
may be required to draw on general considerations in favor of a deliberative 
process to justify those policies whose precise terms they do not accept.178 And 
in any case, the process of deliberation will need to be capped by a vote that 
determines, definitively, whether the state will adopt the policy in question. 
Even though it must be capped in this way, the ideal deliberative procedure 
gives collective decision-making an epistemic character that ought to be familiar. 
In requiring participants to direct their political justifications to a heterogeneous 
audience, deliberation forces the participants to adduce broad reasons, since 
only such reasons will provide a common ground from which political 
                                                
173 Rawls, supra note 5, at 131.  
174 Notably, the “common schools”—the precursor to today’s primary public schools—were 
conceived to homogenize the American population by inculcating broadly Protestant values. See 
Matthew Steilen, Parental Rights and the State Regulation of Religious Schools, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 269, 307-30. The founders’ unrealized plans for state education were also based in large 
part on a concern for homogeneity, which they believed would generate the shared interests 
and a sense of loyalty necessary for the federal government to survive. Id. at 293-94. 
175 Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 96.  
176 Rawls, supra note 5, at 136-37. 
177 E.g., Reflections, supra note 152, at 331.  
178 Procedure and Substance, supra note 4, at 100. 
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argument can proceed in a fundamentally diverse society. As above, broad 
reasons have a force over our deliberative opponents because they show how 
our own views answer to the facts. In this sense, ideal political deliberation is a 
kind of epistemic process, by incorporating our techniques for assessing claims to 
knowledge into the model of political deliberation.179 
B.  Comparing Common-Law Adjudicat ion and the Ideal  Del iberat ive  
Procedure 
As a starting point, it will be useful to summarize the features of common-law 
adjudication and the ideal deliberative procedure identified above. In the 
following table, the rows represent the characteristics ascribed to common-law 
adjudication and the ideal deliberative procedure. The grey boxes represent 
points of possible contrast. 
                                                
179 See Bohman & Rehg, supra note 154, at xv-xvi (“[A]n ideal procedural model provides the 
basis for an ‘epistemic’ interpretation of democratic outcomes. This interpretation presupposes 
that deliberation involves a cognitive process of assessing arguments and forming judgments 
about the common good, and that there is some standard, independent of the actual process, 
according to which the outcome of deliberation is either correct or incorrect. Because the 
relevant standard is an ideal procedure, correctness does not imply a realist or metaphysical 
conception of political truth or the common good. Rather, the ideal procedure specifies the 
counterfactual conditions for public debate and practical reasoning that would allow for the 
best possible discussion of a political issue on the merits . . . .”); cf. Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic 
Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 34 (1986). 
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Fig.  1.  The Common law and Deliberative Democracy Compared 
  
 
(A) Common-Law Adjudication (B) The Ideal Deliberative Procedure 
1 
 
Requires that a judicial decision be 
justified, and includes procedures 
that require legal argument by the 
litigants and the court. 
 
Aims at political justification, as 





Free deliberation among equals? 
 
Requires certain conditions for 
deliberation, namely, that 
deliberation be free and the 
participants treated as equals. 
3 
 
Requires the justification to be 
directed at the litigants, principally 
the losing litigant and all those 
potentially affected by the ruling. 
 
Requires that political 
justification be directed at those 
bound by the collective decision. 
4 
 
Requires broad reasons to justify a 
decision to those with an adverse 
view of the law. 
 
Requires reasons in support of 
state action that diverse citizens 
can reasonably regard as 
compelling. 
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5 
 
Requires an ongoing assessment of 
whether the rule announced in 
precedent ought to bind the 





Enables litigants to directly 
participate in determining the 





In what follows, I will examine both putative points of comparison and 
contrast suggested by the table. I argue that, in light of their similarities, 
common-law adjudication and the ideal deliberative procedure are two forms of 
deliberative lawmaking. The points of contrast are relevant to determining whether 
a form of deliberative lawmaking is properly regarded as democratically 
legitimate. 
1. Points of Comparison 
Deliberative lawmaking is a method of lawmaking that (1) aims to justify the 
law decided on, and involves a process of decision-making that requires the 
production of such a justification; (2) requires this justification to be directed at 
those bound by the law; and (3) requires the justification to comprise broad 
reasons—reasons that will be persuasive to a diverse audience. Such methods 
of lawmaking are fairly called “deliberative” because they incorporate the 
exchange of reasons into the lawmaking process itself. 
As rows 1, 3, and 4 in the table above suggest, both common-law adjudication 
and the ideal deliberative procedure are forms of deliberative lawmaking. This 
is perhaps not a significant claim for the ideal deliberative procedure. But it is a 
significant claim for the common law. Despite a rough consensus about its 
content, common-law adjudication is not typically regarded as a fundamentally 
deliberative procedure. But it is such a procedure. Common-law adjudication 
requires the court and litigants to engage in an exchange of reasons directed at 
justifying the application of precedent to the instant case. The nature of this 
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exchange leads the litigants and the court to examine the underlying 
justification of the law, in order to determine whether it should apply, and if so, 
what content it should have. In this way, the common law utilizes deliberation 
to shape the content of the legal rules that bind the parties and others similarly 
situated. This makes it a form of deliberative lawmaking. 
Despite these characteristics, it can be tempting to conclude that common-law 
adjudication cannot be deliberative, because it involves the application of 
precedent, and appeal to precedent is not normally part of political deliberation. 
Participants in political deliberation may appeal to precedent, but such appeals 
must stand on their own, in the sense that they are evaluated just as other 
reasons in favor of, or against, a proposed collective decision. While 
participants in political deliberation may simply reject precedent, participants in 
common-law adjudication may not, since their dispute will be governed by 
precedent. Of course, this is an important distinction between adjudication and 
political decision-making. But it does not imply that adjudication is non-
deliberative. Rather, the right way to capture the distinction is as relating to the 
subject of deliberation. The subject of deliberation in common-law adjudication 
is how and why precedent applies to the case at hand. In other words, 
common-law adjudication requires the parties to justify their formulation, 
application, and distinction of precedent—and, on occasion, their request that 
the court fashion a new rule. That this is the subject of deliberation in 
common-law adjudication is irrelevant to whether the process itself is 
deliberative. The process is deliberative because it possesses the features 
identified above in section III.B—features shared in common with the ideal 
deliberative procedure. It is virtue of possessing those features that the process 
legitimates the decision that arises out of it.180 
The thesis that common-law adjudication is deliberative is significant for a 
second reason as well. Opposed parties in litigation naturally take different 
views of the content of the law. The party requesting the court to grant it relief 
takes a view of whether the law supports that relief that differs from the 
opposing party. As we have seen, this opposition injects a kind of “diversity” 
into the deliberative procedure at the heart of the common law. Because the 
parties have diverse interests, the court’s justification for its decision will need 
                                                
180 Another way to frame the criticism is this: political deliberation is about making the law, 
while common-law adjudication is about applying it. Given that the law already exists in 
common-law adjudication, how could the process be deliberative in the same sense as political 
deliberation? The obvious answer is that there is not a clear distinction, at common law, 
between making the law and applying it. In common-law adjudication, the law is made through 
successive applications. The adjudicatory process thus gives litigants who reject the authority of 
a precedent the opportunity to challenge it. 
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to appeal to broad reasons to be reasonably compelling to both parties, as well 
as others affected by the ruling. In the context of political deliberation, 
“reasonable pluralism” has much the same effect. Thus, the reasons that we can 
reasonably expect others to regard as compelling in political deliberation will 
also need to be “broad,” in the sense that they will need to appeal to individuals 
with a variety of points of view. The idea of “breadth” operative here was 
important because it was part of a normal way of thinking about knowledge, 
and, in particular, of how we demonstrate to others that we are entitled to our 
judgments about the world. It makes sense that procedures for resolving 
disputes and for coordinating social conduct would make use of this familiar 
procedure. The idea that judicial decisions and collective decisions are simply 
judgments justified in light of the facts provides a neutral framework for 
resolving our most important conflicts. 
2. Points of Contrast 
The crucial question is whether the deliberative procedure at the heart of 
common-law adjudication provides judicial decisions with democratic legitimacy. 
The thought that it does is based on the following inference: if the ideal 
deliberative procedure gives enacted law its legitimacy, then the deliberative 
procedure in common-law adjudication should give the common law a similar 
kind of legitimacy. 
a. Equality and participation 
Only free public reasoning among equals legitimates a collective decision. This 
is because, under the deliberative theory of democracy, a collective decision is 
legitimated if and only if it is justified to all those bound by it. A decision is 
justified to all those bound by it when reasons are produced in support of the 
decision that each person should reasonably regard as compelling. But 
persuading each person by seeking out reasonable common ground is treating 
each person as an equally deserving of persuasion, and acknowledging their 
freedom to make their mind up as they see fit. Thus, equality and freedom are 
internal to the idea of deliberation as a justificatory device. Without these 
conditions, deliberation cannot constitute political justification and, therefore, 
cannot legitimate state action.181 
                                                
181 This is a significant point. In places, Josh Cohen suggests that the theory of deliberative 
democracy has two separable aspects to it: deliberation and democracy. See, e.g., Reflections, supra 
note 152, at 329. As I see it, there must be an “internal” relationship between deliberation and 
democracy for deliberation to be a theory of what makes democratic law legitimate. The 
relationship I see is that deliberation, under certain conditions, generates democratic legitimacy. 
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On its face, the common law appears to lack the conditions of freedom and 
equality. The court is the decision-maker. While the court may aim to justify its 
decision to the litigants, it need not do so; and even if a losing litigant remains 
unpersuaded of the court’s view (a state of affairs that is not uncommon), the 
court’s view will control the allocation of rights and obligations between the 
parties. Thus, the court and the litigants are not treated as equals in the 
deliberation between them. Nor are the litigants free to act on their own 
conclusions about the content of the law. For the adjudicatory process to serve 
its most basic function, the parties must be compelled to abide by the court’s 
order, regardless of their own conclusions. Indeed, this principle is expressly 
manifested in aspects of procedural law.182 
The appearance of contrast here is somewhat misleading. The institutional 
framework in which political deliberation takes place is in fact similar to that of 
the common law in the relevant respects. Deliberation between citizens can 
only go so far in a representative democracy. Eventually matters must come to 
a vote, and they typically do so within one or more legislative bodies. With 
respect to the views of those bound by a collective decision, legislators in these 
bodies operate much like judges on a panel; while they may aim to demonstrate 
to constituents that a collective decision is wise, the validity of the decision 
does not in any way turn on their successfully doing so. Nor are citizens 
entitled under positive law to simply go about their business and ignore a 
collective decision they regard as wrong-headed or unjust, if collective decisions 
are to serve their most basic function. As noted above, nothing in this process 
need undermine a deliberative theory of democratic legitimacy. Similarly, 
nothing about the court’s role as decision-maker in common-law adjudication 
need undermine the claim that common-law adjudication can be democratically 
legitimate. 
Moreover, unlike the legislative process, the common law permits litigants to 
directly participate in the deliberative process that will determine the content of 
the law applied to them. A litigant who believes that a rule of law does not 
apply is given an opportunity to present that argument to the decision-making 
body itself—the court. Although this advocacy is carried out under the 
specialized norms of legal reasoning, as opposed to those of workaday political 
                                                                                                                        
In other words, the idea of deliberation captures the legitimating force in democratic decision-
making. If it does not, and if there is a stable notion of democratic decision-making 
independent of deliberation, then there must be a more fundamental norm for explaining 
democratic legitimacy. 
182 E.g., the collateral bar rule: an injunction must be obeyed by the parties in order to challenge 
the merits of the injunction. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1967) (citing Howat 
v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922)). 
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discussion, this does not divest the deliberation of its legitimating force.183 
Legitimacy depends rather on whether the process that terminates in a judicial 
decision involves the court and the litigations in deliberation, and whether the 
judicial decision that results is reasonably justified to all those bound by it.184 
Moreover, this deliberation is subsequently carried out on any occasion where a 
party is willing to argue before the court that the rule should not apply to it, or 
should be altered in some way. This gives judicial decision-making a 
participatory aspect to it that legislative decision-making simply lacks. 
b. The accountability of decision-makers 
Of course, even under an ideal democratic theory, there are several significant 
differences between legislative decision-making and judicial decision-making. A 
principal difference concerns the office of the decision-maker itself: the 
legislator is usually elected, and the judge often is not. Moreover, this 
distinction is often thought to directly affect the quality of judicial reasoning, on 
the supposition that by insulating judges from political forces, we free them to 
make unpopular decisions that are nonetheless right. This is at least part of the 
idea of “judicial independence,” but its obvious price would seem to be 
democratic legitimacy. 
“Judicial independence” is an important point, and, I think, any fair view of this 
issue must regard it as impacting the democratic character of judicial decisions. 
But, again, this point must be handled with care, and it is easy to make too 
much of it. First, the state court judges who create much of the substantive 
common law in this country are, in most cases, subject to some form of 
popular vote, either because they must seek election to obtain or retain their 
office.185 Second, even the need to seek reelection does not, in all 
circumstances, require a legislator to justify collective decisions to all those 
bound by those decisions. This is obviously the case for citizens who are not 
constituents of a legislator. Among constituents, “discrete and insular” 
minorities may exercise little voting power, and the failure to justify a collective 
                                                
183 But see Strauss, supra note 22, at 933 (arguing that the method of common-law 
constitutionalism is not democratic, but that its substance may be). 
184 In this sense, the greatest threat to the democratic legitimacy of judicial decisions is the 
temptation of the court to make a decision without giving the parties an opportunity to 
examine the court’s basis for decision. The process of coming to a judicial decision must be 
deliberative. 
185 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16. According to the ABA, state supreme court justices must 
seek election in twenty-one states, and election after appointment in seventeen other states. 
Judges in the remaining states enjoy life tenure or may be reappointed. ABA Standing 
Committee on Judicial Independence, Fact Sheet, available at: 
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/fact.html. 
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decision to such minorities may have little consequence at the ballot box.186 
Even diffuse majorities may be unable to impact the re-election of a legislator 
who has failed to justify her votes, if she can obtain the support of an organized 
and motivated minority.187 These are familiar ideas. 
In contrast, the norms of common-law adjudication require judges to 
reasonably justify their decisions to all those bound by them. As described 
above, this is internal to the process of deciding cases by precedent, which 
requires the common-law judge to determine whether the instant case is similar 
in relevant respects to precedent. It is also part of the larger adjudicatory 
framework, which requires the court to demonstrate to the losing litigant, and 
to others similarly situated, why the law supports the court’s decision. These are 
not nominal requirements. They are supported by layers of review, some of 
which are performed by judges who may be inclined to take a different view of 
the law. Beyond this, the ability of the court to effectively adjudicate the dispute 
before it and to maintain its institutional authority over the long run depends in 
part on whether it can reasonably justify its rulings to litigants. Apart from the 
unusual exercise of its contempt power, a court largely depends on its reasoning 
to persuade hostile parties to cooperate with each other, pursuant to its orders. 
None of this is meant to deny that the popular election of legislators is central 
to a democracy. A decision-making body directed solely by unelected officers 
cannot be described as “democratic,” because this term connotes, in part, the 
political institutions and individual rights characteristic of democracies. 
Nonetheless, the decisions of such a body can be legitimate. The basic idea of 
democratic legitimacy is that the “authorization to exercise public power . . . 
arises from collective decisions by citizens over whom that power is 
exercised.”188 Elections make political representations consistent with this basic 
idea of legitimacy, by keeping representatives accountable to citizens.189 Yet 
other practices may serve the same end. My argument has been that common-
law adjudication is such a practice. The norms of common-law adjudication, 
articulated above, require the court to remain responsive to the concerns of 
                                                
186 Cf. Ely, supra note 21, at 135-36, 152.  
187 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the 
Creation of Public Policy 51 (2001). 
188 Joshua Cohen, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY 187 
(2009); accord ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 107-08 (1989) (identifying the 
assumptions of a democratic order). 
189 Although representative democracy seems straightforward to us now, the idea of political 
representation and democratic government are far from natural partners. See DAHL, supra note 
188, at 27-30. 
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litigants and others affected by its ruling. The result is a process of adjudicating 
disputes that is, in many ways, a kind of “collective decision-making.” 
c. Ongoing assessment  
The rules of the substantive common law are undergoing constant change. This 
is a product both of the power of common-law judges to fashion new rules 
and, less dramatically, to apply precedent or distinguish it from the case before 
them. Most forms of statutory law do not undergo this kind of change. This is 
not true of all “written” law; in some cases, statutes are expressed in terms of 
basic values or ideals, and therefore require the development of common-law-
like principles that show how to apply the values and ideals to concrete settings. 
The best example is probably the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment. There are other examples as well. Yet setting aside 
these cases, statutory law does not develop and change in response to changing 
circumstances in the same way that the substantive common law does. 
The stasis of statutory law gives rise to the well-known problem of the 
government by the “dead hand.” It is not obvious why the decisions of 
representatives long dead legitimately bind our conduct. We did not vote for 
these individuals, and they often have little in common with us. David Strauss 
has argued that the common law faces much less of this problem.190 This 
derives from the ongoing control we retain over the content of the common 
law, and from the very process, described above, of applying that law to the 
situations that we now face. This directly impacts the democratic legitimacy of 
the common law. Even if it is unelected officers who decide on how a 
common-law rule ought to apply, those officers are our rough contemporaries, 
and therefore can have some understanding of the conditions giving rise to the 
legal question. Given that state judges are elected in most states, the democratic 
advantage of the common law is, in fact, significant. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law is democratically legitimate to the extent that it incorporates a 
deliberative procedure carried out under the conditions of freedom and equality 
that characterize the ideal deliberative procedure of deliberative democracy. I 
have suggested several reasons why we should think that this is the case. 
Principally, the intuitive picture of common-law adjudication developed in Part 
III—a process of justifying a decision to those affected—is one with obvious 
similarities to the ideal deliberative procedure. Beyond this point, the obvious 
                                                
190 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 24-25, 99-114. 
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rejoinders about the role of the court and the election of the judges are easily 
overstated, if real distinctions. Legislators exercise a similar authority over the 
so-called “collective decisions” enacted into statutory law, and the influence of 
election on the conditions of deliberation are far from apparent. 
Yet it can still seem a bit dumbfounding to suggest that common-law decisions 
may be democratically legitimate. How could they be? And if they were, 
wouldn’t it simply be a reductio ad absurdum of the theory of democracy that 
supported this conclusion? The right response, I think, is to concede that 
common-law decisions are not democratic—in the sense of being a result of 
vote by elected officers—but to insist that they do not lack the legitimacy of 
democratic decisions. The legitimacy that common-law decisions enjoy is the 
legitimacy that derives from subjecting a decision to the scrutiny of those 
bound by it. This is the same legitimacy that democratic law enjoys under the 
ideal deliberative procedure. The primary differences between the common law 
and deliberative democracy are in the ways the respective institutions apportion 
final control over the act of decision-making, and ensure that the decision-
maker remains accountable to those bound by his decisions. These differences 
affect the extent of democratic legitimacy, not its very existence. 
Another doubt which is likely to persist is that we have not addressed the root 
problem affecting the legitimacy of common-law adjudication: the nature of 
judicial decision-making. Despite the protests of the parties, common-law 
judges remain able to resolve cases as they want to by manipulating 
precedent—a topic conveniently passed over. This, in essence, was Justice 
Scalia’s concern, wasn’t it? 
Much remains to be said about judicial decision-making and whether common-
law precedent does constrain it. But putting this issue aside, I think the 
comparison to deliberative democracy above shows that the doubter’s view of 
judicial decision-making is seriously impoverished. Several points should make 
this clear. First, the doubt conflates the initial development of an argument with 
the process of deliberating with another about it. In imagining arguments one 
could use to support one’s request for relief from the court, creativity is indeed 
the rule. However, the latter idea—deliberation—is very different; deliberation 
is the process of subjecting one’s creative arguments to the scrutiny of 
independent minds. And while it is “easy” to come up with a request for relief 
(or an order granting relief), it is often extremely difficult to persuade others 
that the request (or order) is persuasive. This leads to a second point, which is 
that the doubt belies the tremendous confidence we have in the deliberative 
process. Deliberation lies at the center of several of our most important 
decision-making institutions. If it were merely a sham, then we should have a 
